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DETERMINANTB OF CANADIAN AID POLICY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2.2 billion dollars which Canada spends annually on foreign aidl will not 
by itself change the course of development in the Third World. But it can, if 
properly used, have an appreciable impact on those countries or sectors of 
intervention where it is concentrated. Questions arise regarding the extent to 
which Canadian ald does in fact pursue developmental objectives and the extent 
to which aid policy is so designed as to maximize the potential impact which 
the aid might have on world poverty. 
This paper is an attempt better to understand the nature of Canadian aid 
policy. Much attention is given to the motives and objectives underlying that 
policy, because there continues to be much debate in Canada about the 'true' 
objectives of the aid program and the reasons why these have been important. 
The title of this paper refers to the "determinants" of Canadian aid policy. 
Such determinants may be both domestic and international in scope, and might be 
classified for convenience into four groups: 
-ideology and social values, Including for instance the attitudes of Canadian 
regarding the proper role of the state in matters of income distribution, or 
the sense of community which Canadians feel with regard to the rest of the 
world and the Third World in particular; 
-political determinants, including the electoral process by which widespread 
social values may find their expression in policy, and such obvious factors as 
political leadership, the Influence of special interests, and bureaucratic 
politics; 
-economic determinants, such as the health of the domestic economy or the 
changing needs of developing countries; and 
-international factors, including pressures applied by recipient countries, and 
foreign policy considerations such as those associated with international 
agreements in matters of foreign aid. 
The motives and objectives of the aid program may be considered in this context 
as a sort of intermediate determinant helping to explain specific policies, but 
determined at the outset by more 'primary' determinants such as the above. 
Additional complexity can be added to the model in several ways. Aid policies 
evolve and accumulate over time and cannot therefore be properly analyzed in 
any other than a historical context. Policier which are created in response to 
some particular conjuncture of Influences or political leadership tend to 
endure even as circumstances change, while policies also respond to acquired 
experience and perceptions of policy effectiveness, so that results obtained 
from one set of policies become determinants of new policies at a subsequent 
stage. Consider finally that aid policies of varlous sorts are interrelated 
one to the other for coherence and thus become, in a sense, determinants of 
each other. 
1 CIDA, Annual Report, 1985-86. Unless othervise stated, all data in this paper are deno.inated in 
Canadian dollars ($1 Cad. = $.15 US). The ter. 'billion' is being used here in the American sense of one 
thousand Billion. 
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The following diagram introduces these additional considerations and specifies 
some of the determinants which will reappear at different times in this paper. 
MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES-A------------------> POLICIES--->------- > 
-_-------1-------------1--------------------------------- 
-social values and ideology 
-political leadership and 
domestic structures of Influence 
-economic conditions in Canada and the Third World 
-international and foreign policy considerations l<------ 
-existing policy 
-perceptions of policy effectiveness 
As mentioned earlier, our attention in this paper revolves largely around the 
motives and objectives underlying Canadian aid. From a behavioural point of 
view, it is useful to distinguish between the international, national and 
private objectives which might motivate a donor such as Canada. 
International objectiv include such categories as the reduction of world 
poverty, t e urt ering of world peace and democracy, or the alleviation of the 
international debt crisis, inter alla. These are international public goods 
which would best be supplied by some sort of world government and taxation 
authority, if it existed (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969; Russett and Sullivan, 
1971; Sandler et al., 1978, 63-67). In the absence of such an international 
authority, contributions by individual countries are voluntary, and depend on 
each country's sense of community and shared destiny with the rest of the 
world, reinforced as this may be by burden-sharing agreements of various sorts. 
Relatively large contributors are rewarded with 'prestige,' a commodity whose 
importance should not be discounted since it does tend to accrue 
disproportionately to the "foreign policy elite" responsible for designing a 
donor's aid policy. This does not mean that internationalist ideals are absent 
from the process - the concept of prestige itself would be meaningless in the 
absence of moral values - but it does mean that the contributions of individual 
donors cannot be understood in isolation. One would expect the contributions 
of each donor to vary at least in part as a function of the efforts being made 
by the Test of the donor community, and one would expect all donors to be 
concerned with the notion of 'burden sharing.' 
The degree to which internationalist motivations such as the above constitute 
the main inspiration for giving aid will depend upon a variety of factors, 
including the extent to which a sense of community exists at the international 
level, the extent to which to which donors successfully coordinate their 
contributions, and the extent to which various international objectives such as 
poverty alleviation, world peace or the maintenance of Western democracy are 
seen to reinforce each other. For individual donors, It will depend on each 
country's commitment to international values and the degree to which the 
country feels its own contribution wili make a difference. 
Aid can aiso be used for strictly national objectives, however, be it for the 
promotion of the donor country's export industries or the pursuit of other 
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foreign policy objectives important to the national interest. Foreign aid being 
provided by the national government of the donor country, it would be 
surprising if such objectives were nQt pursued to some extent. 
Within the donor country, aid can and does also satisfy private objectives. 
The most obvious of these are economic in nature and accrue to both business 
and labour involved in providing products and services to foreign countries 
benefiting from foreign aid. Aid also provides jobs and careers for civil 
servants and for non-government organizations. This raises the possibility of 
foreign aid being abused by individuals and firms involved in its 
Implementation, and it is possible likewise for the personal and bureaucratic 
objectives of aid officiais to conflict with the effective Implementation of 
the aid program's broader objectives (Tendler; Wyse). 
The true motives behind foreign aid are difficult to separate, since rhetoric 
and reality may not match. Ail three types of motivation - international, 
national and privaté - are influential to some degree, and the question is that 
of identifying the balance existing between them. Canadian government 
pronouncements on foreign aid have consistently given pride of place to the 
internationalist and humanitarian objective of fostering development in poor 
countries, but critics have questioned the veracity of such rhetoric. 
Carty and Smith put it bluntly, stating that "a review of the content of Agency 
programs rather than its press releases shows that the humanitarian aim is in 
fact close to the bottom of Canada's aid agenda" (p. 39). The more moderate 
North-South Institute tends to arrive at a similar, though more nuanced 
conclusion, suggesting in a preliminary report on its evaluation of Canadian 
aid to four major recipient countries that development tends to be 'crowded 
out' by other objectives such as Canada's economic and political interests 
(May, 1983, p. 4). Similar points of view have been expressed by Pratt (1984b), 
Freeman (Autumn 1980) and Dupuis (1984), while Dudley and Monmarquette wrote an 
entire book on the possible motivations behind Canadian aid without ever giving 
humanitarian or altruistic motives serlous consideration (1978, p. 43). Nossal 
opts for "organizational maintenance" (which is to say respect for the 
sovereignty of other states), and "prestige" as key motivating interests (Jan. 
1984), a viewpoint which does not necessarily deny the importance of 
internationalist values (as we have argued above), though Nossal does not 
mention the link. 
Many social scientists are uncomfortable with explanations of behaviour which 
depend on appeals to humanitarian motives or a sense of community, and the 
tendency to look to other forms of explanations as 'primary' is evident in the 
literature mentioned above. Arguments concerning the non-humanitarian motives 
of aid encourage readers to be realistic about the expectations which may be 
held of government Institutions, and discussions which encourage skepticism 
about government rhetoric serve a useful and important purpose. But realism can 
also stoke the fines of cynicism and it is useful at some point to reconsider 
the Issue. 
Sections II and III below review first the rhetoric and then the practice of 
Canadian ald. section II constitutes a survey of Canadian attitudes and 
statements about foreign aid, as expressed by the general public, interest 
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groups and the Canadian government. Section III proceeds to survey the major 
dimensions of the Canadian aid program itself, and the paper concludes, in 
Section IV, with an attempt to draw together the major points which can be made 
about the determinants of Canadian aid policy. 
II. VOTERS, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
This section deals with two types of domestic determinants - public opinion and 
interest group pressure - and proceeds from there to review the role played by 
key political actors in the recent history of Canadian aid. This last 
subsection provides a convenient context for reviewing the official rhetoric 
about Canada's aid objectives and how these have evolved over time. 
Perceptions of Foreign Aid. 
We begin with the question of how typical Canadians perceive the role of 
foreign aid. For this, one may look at the results of varlous opinion polis 
which have been taken over the years, some of which have been quite 
comprehensive (for a brief survey, see Wyse, 1984, Appendix). The main 
questions asked relate to the degree of favour expressed for the aid program 
and the reasons why respondents feel Canada should give foreign aid. It may be 
asked whether public opinion counts for much in these matters, since it is not 
"typical" Canadians who make foreign policy decisions. Public opinion does help 
to set the agenda, however, and it sets limits to what a government may or may 
not do (Stairs, 1977-78), ail the more so when the ruling government is 
politically vulnerable (Fleming and Keenleyside, 1983). To what extent is 
Canadian public opinion consistent with a generous foreign aid program based on 
internationalist values? That is our question. 
A good place to start is a recent opinion survey which has gone beyond the 
usual questions about foreign aid, to investigate the attitudes of Canadians to 
foreign policy issues generally. In the context of our previous discussion on 
different types of motivations for providing aid, it is interesting to note 
that mQst Canadians do in fart express sym th for internationalist values. As 
the pollinq agency concluded in its report to the Department o x ernal 
Affairs: 
"[the image of] Canada as a moral, humane, peaceable, caring 
society is a very deeply embedded image, and is a very important 
aspect of the Canadian identity and one Canadians seem to take 
pride in. From this perspective, foreign policy initiatives 
that deal with aid to the Third World, alleviating hunger and 
poverty, seeking solutions to the nuclear arms race, speaking out 
against human rights violations are thought of by the majority of 
Canadians as part of being Canadian, part of the national 
character, and not associated with any one political party" 
(Decima Research Ltd., 1985, pp. 54-5). 
Most Canadians also support the aid program, and they do so for reasons which 
can be termed 'humanitarian' in nature. Of those who supported foreign aid in 
a 1980 poli con uc ed by A com Research, almost ail did so by virtue of the 
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wealth or income differences between Canada and the Third World, citing either 
"humanitarian reasons" (59%) or the fact that "Canada is rich..." (29%). Only 
4% volunteered "trade benefits for Canada" as a basis for aid, even though 
multiple responses were accepted. Other responses were interesting mainly for 
the rarity with which they were expressed. These included "prestige for 
Canada..." (2%), "the promotion of peace" (2%), and "the blocking of communism" 
(1%). 
Yet Canadians do not reject the possibility of using aid to promote Canadian 
economic interests or influence abroad. The Adcom Research poil of 1980 found 
that 28% of respondents (including both supporters and opponents of aid) 
thought that the main priority of the aid program should be to build Canadian 
trade, while 4% thought it should be to increase Canada's influence in the 
world. These figures might have been less if multiple responses had not been 
permitted, however (total responses added up to 115% on this question). Most 
respondents (72%) believed that aid generates benefits for Canada as well as 
for the Third World (although this includes those who identify "moral 
satisfaction" as a benefit), and there is also a strong feeling that Canada 
should benefit. Many respondents (46%) believed that Canada usually gets too 
small a business return from its aid, and 53% held that Canadian aid should be 
tied to the purchase of Canadian products. 
However most Canadians in 1985 did not seem willing to sacrifice the 
developmental effectiveness of aid on the aitar of commercial benefits. Asked 
to choose between directing Canadian aid in such a way as to increase sales of 
Canadian products and services or removing tying conditions in order to better 
address Third World needs, 72% of respondents to the Decima Research poil opted 
in favour of the latter proposition. 
The best statement on the degree of Canadian support of the aid program is 
probably that which can be gauged from opinions on appropriate levels for 
Canadian aid. On this issue, one usually finds between 75% and 80% of the 
population to be in favour of current or increased aid levels. Of those 
expressing an opinion in the Adcom Research poli of 1980, 39% felt that aid 
should be increased, 39% felt that it should be kept the came, while 22% felt 
it should be decreased or ended. This result is roughly consistent with those 
of various Gallup polis taken between 1975 and 1981 which showed about half the 
Canadian population in support of increased foreign aid. It is also consistent 
with the resuit obtained by Buckridian in a 1973 survey of the Ottawa region, 
where 'increasers' numbered 44% of those expressing an opinion (Buckridian, p. 
109). 
Results such as these do seem to depend rather delicately upon the phrasing of 
the question. Many Canadian polis, some going as far back as the 1960s, have 
asked an almost identical question about support for further growth of the aid 
program, to which different results were obtained. These polis ask not whether 
aid should be increased, but simply whether present levels are too low, just 
about right or too high. Paradoxically, the number who think aid is too low 
has tended to be much less than the number who think It should be increased. 
Results indicate that a variable proportion ranginq from 11 to 22 percent 
belleve that aid levels are too low; between 50 and 60 percent usually believe 
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that they are about right; and a sizable minority, usually about one-third, 
believe that they are too high. 
The paradox can be explained by assuming that many of those who think that ald 
levels are "just about right" would nonetheless support a small increase. This 
interpretation Is vindlcated by one of the most interesting results to coure out 
of the Buckridian survey. In a follow up question to that of whether or not 
aid should be increased, Buckridian faced respondents with the fact that such 
an Increase would have to be pald for out of taxes. This should reasonably 
have yielded a decrease In the number of declared 'increasers', since people 
would be made more aware of the costs of increasing ald, but this is not what 
happened. Instead, the number of 'increasers' actually rose, going from 44% to 
56% of the respondent population. The reason for this is apparently that 
Buckridian allowed respondents to specify limits to how much of a tax increase 
they would be willing to countenance: 28.4% of respondents opted for less than 
1% increase; 23.8% opted for between 1% and 5%; and only 4% opted for more than 
5%. Most Canadians thus seem willing to increase aid, but only in incremental 
amounts. 
Turning more specifically now to elite opinion, data are available on two types 
of elite groups: a broad socio-economic elite of better-educated, higher- 
income Canadians, and the "foreign policy elite", a much smaller group which 
includes those who are directly or indirectly involved in foreign policy making 
(Byers et al., 1977, pp. 605-7). In those few cases where opinion polis have 
differentiated between different socio-economic groups, it has generally been 
found that Income and education correlate quite strongly and positively with 
willingness to extend foreign ald. 'Increaser' in the Buckridian survey 
numbered 54% of those with post-secondary education who expressed an opinion, 
but only 33% and 32% respectively in two less-educated groups (Buckridlan, 
1974, p. 135 and Appendix 5; see also Canada, 1980, p. 65; and O'Manique, 1979, 
pp. 124-5). 
As for the foreign policy elite, It Is here that we find the most positive 
attitudes of all to foreign ald, with fully half of the respondent population 
(or 61% of those expressing an opinion) favouring not just an increase in aid 
but a doubling of ald levels in the late 1970s (Lyon and Tomlin, 1979, p. 157). 
The saine survey showed that 76% of respondents expressing an opinion perceived 
Canadian aid as primarily humanitarian in motivation, while other results 
indicated a strong preference that It should stay that way (Lyon and Tomlin, 
157-9). 
Interesting Insights into the preoccupations of Canada's foreign policy elite 
can be derived from the subject matter addressed by respondents having chosen 
to make presentations to the recent Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations. Hearings were held in 
major cities all across the country, and it is remarkable to what extent the 
issues addressed were international in focus rather than simply Issues of 
Canadian Interest in the International arena. Over three quarters of the 
written submissions recelved by the Committee dealt with three broad concerns: 
human rights in South Africa and Central America (142 responses), peace and 
arms control (109), and development assistance (73). Only 16 responses dealt 
with the issues of trade and economic competitiveness, a result which can be 
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partly explained by the fact that separate hearings had recently been held on 
the issue of Canada-U.S. free trade. Summing up, the Committee's report 
attributes to the respondents a belief that international co-operation could 
lead to a better ordered and more equitable world, and a conviction that Canada 
should work responsibly and actively towards this goal (Canada, Interdependence 
and Internationalism, pp. 7-24). 
The sensitivity of opinion poli results to the wording of questions and to the 
context in which they are posed makes It difficult to study the evolution of 
public opinion over time. In the absence of solid Information proving the 
contrary, and with some evidence to support the case (data from the 1960s 
surveyed in Wyse are more or less comparable to those avallable for the 1960s 
in the Goldfarb Report '85, p. 67), it appears that the number of 'increasers' 
has remained approximately constant over the last twenty years. Since Canadian 
aid flows have risen substantially over this period, one could say that general 
support for aid has in some sense increased. 
The largest shift in public opinion regarding foreign aid probably occurred in 
the 1960s, climaxing in a spurt of voluntary activity at the end of that 
decade. This was the era in which Miles for Millions marches were born and in 
which hundreds of thousands of Canadians first exchanged blisters and sore feet 
for cash contributions to the cause of development.2 Many new non- 
governmental organizations were created at this time, and the number of 
Canadian NGOs working in international development grew from about 20 in 1963 
to over 120 in 1972 (CIDA, Partners in Tomorrow, P. 11). Canadian support for 
NGO activities did not fade in the harsher economic climate of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, but it did stabilize. Although the number of NGOs continued to 
grow - there were over 200 receiving funds from CIDA in 1983 - there was no 
growth in the real value of private voluntary assistance between 1970 and 1983 
(CIDA, Partners in Tomorrow, p. 11; and Sewell et al. eds., Table D-6, p. 296). 
The years 1984 and 1985 witnessed a strong upsurge in voluntary contributions 
in response to the famine in Africa and the surrounding media publicity. 
Contributions in real terms rose by 12.6% in 1984 and 21.3% in 1985, and public 
support for foreign aid has correspondingly increased in recent years. 
Interest GrouDs 
Private sector organizations with a special interest in foreign aid issues may 
be divided into two groups: those whose concern is primarily e hical or 
and whose lobby activities may be perceived as being of a "general 
interest" variety; and those with particular or private_interest in aid. 
General-interest groups are mostly pro-aid and generally advocate a more 
generous, basic-needs oriented aid program. The exception is Citizens for 
Foreign Aid Reform (C-FAR), as lobby group of right-wing activists which uses 
the mass media to draw attention to the weaknesses of the aid program as they 
perceive them. C-FAR's views are well illustrated by Fromm and Hull's Down the 
2 the marches began in 1967 as one of Canada's centennial anniversary projects. By 1969, 400,000 
Canadians vert marching in 114 places, collecting $5 million [roi sponsors that year (Canada, CIDA, 
International Develooment. April 1970, p.8). 
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Drain? A Critical Re-examination of Canadian Foreign Aid (1981), and a flavour 
of the tone and lack of subtlety of their publications can be gained from the 
title which C-FAR gave to its pamphlet criticizing aid to Tanzania, "Let Them 
Eat Nyerere ! 
Other groups have likewise been critical of Canadian aid, but almost always 
with the purpose of advocating reform in a humanitarian and internationalist 
direction by opposing such "mixed objective" policies such as procurement 
tylng. Examples of this type of critical stance can be found in the work 
supported by research groups such as the North-South Institute (NSI, 1977), 
1980, 1983; Young, 1983; Ehrhardt, 1983; English, 1984; Lavergne forth.) and 
the more radical Latin American Working Group (Carty and Smith, 1981). 
Other non-governmental institutions such as the churches and NGOs which are 
directly involved in Third World development have been involved In public 
education, operating through the churches, the schools and, to a lesser extent, 
through the mass media. Amounts spent on education and research by these 
organizations have grown quite steadily since CIDA (the Canadian International 
Development Agency) established its Public Participation Program in 1971 in 
order to support public education and awareness activities by NGOs. CIDA 
disbursements through this channel increased from $600,000 In 1971 to $7.8 
million in 1984-85, and total NGO disbursements for education purposes are 
presently in the order of $10-12 million a year. This Is not a lot of money In 
a country of 25 million people, but it must be kept in mind that these funds do 
not include the value of voluntary services and serve mainly to supplement 
resources available to regular teaching staff and clergy in schools and 
churches. Most NGOs allocate between 5% and 25% of their total budgets for 
development education (CCIC, "A Whole New World", p. 11). 
Most NGOs are not directly involved in lobby activities, but some organizations 
do maintain contact with the government. The main body performing such 
functions is the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), founded 
In 1968, which acts as an umbrella organization for about 110 NGOs. In Quebec, 
the Association Québécoise des Organismes de Coopération Internationale (AQOCI) 
performs approximately the saure roles as does CCIC in Ottawa. CCIC's objectives 
include the mobilization of greater Canadian participation in assisting 
international development, improved coordination and cooperation between NGOs, 
and improved links between NGOs and the government In aid matters (CCIC 
Directory, 1978, p. 23). Although its resources are limited, CCIC monitors 
government policy and provides a mechanism for voicing the collective concerns 
of Its members to the government. 
CCIC has limited Its advocacy mainly to the presentation of short resolutions 
and briefs to the government, and these tend to be simple statements of 
position rather than analytical pieces (Clark, pp. 48-50). This is not to say 
that they have no influence, since the NGOs do represent a constituency. 
However, that constituency has Itself been perceived by government officiais to 
be limited In size, and one scholar considers CCIC to have "failed miserably" 
in Its past efforts to influence government policy (Clark, 1985). 
A large number of NGOs have taken advantage of the opportunity to present their 
views to the government in the past two years, through the hearings of three 
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parliamentary committees and subcommittees reviewing Canadian foreign policy: 
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on 
Canada's International Relations; the Senate Committee on International 
Financial Institutions; and the Subcommittee on Overseas Development Assistance 
of the Standing Committee of External Affairs and International Trade.3 
Many authors have considered the commercial interests of Canadian business as 
being of prime explanatory importance in Issues of foreign aid policy (Carty 
and Smith; Dupuis; Pratt, 1982, 1981 a,b). Evidence of varlous sorts can be 
adduced in support of the proposition. The tying of Canadian aid does benefit 
some branches of Canadian business, as do other measures designed to extract 
commercial benefits from the use of Canadian aid. And business interests are 
indeed the principal proponents both of tied aid and of other forms of 
commercial linkages such as mixed credit. This is clearly evident in the 
recommendations of the "Hatch Report" published by a group of businessmen in 
1979 (Export Promotion Review Committee, 1979) and in the position taken by 
business interests in conferences or government consultations touching on ald 
Issues. 
As individuals, Canadian businessmen may or may not be less concerned with 
world poverty than the bulk of Canadian population, but humanitarian concerns 
are largely Irrelevant to the stance which business people and business groups 
take as representatives of business, since it is in that case their 
professional responsibility to support the interests of their clients. This is 
true irrespective of whether the businesses in question are socially or 
privately owned. The Canadian Wheat Board, or even the federal Department of 
Agriculture, is no less interested in tied aid than any private business 
enterprise or organization. Indeed they have been quite active proponents of 
that policy as reflected in the provision of food aid. 
Opportunities for business to make their views known are numerous. They 
include representations made in the context of regular meetings between senior 
government officiais and the aid committee of the Canadian Business and 
Industry International Advisory Committee (CBIIAC - dissolved in 1984),4 ad hoc 
representations by other business organizations such as the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Council of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council, the Canadian Association for Latin America, and the Canadian 
Export Association (which has its own Development Aid Committee), as well as 
representations made by individual businesses. Nor should one fail to mention 
the fact that CIDA officers are in almost daily contact with private sector 
agencies and consultants of one sort or another. It would be surprisinq indeed 
if the cumulative effect of these representations and contacts was not to bias 
3 See pp. 161-196 of the Special Joint Couittee's fane 1986 report for a list of 
couittee vitnesses, and subaissions received. 
4 CBIIÉC vas merged vith the Canadian Council of the International Chaiber of Couerce in 1984 to fors 
the International Business Council of Canada, vhich dues not have an 'aid couittee' per se. It is nov left 
to the Canadian Export Association to handle the question. 
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the uses which are made of Canadian aid towards those which promise commercial 
returns. 
Individual representation by business may be of special importance in this 
process. Individual firms sometimes derive a substantial part of their Income 
from aid contracts5 and have a strong Incentive to use whatever political 
leverage and influence they have at their disposai by virtue of their economic 
power. Interventions by individual firms may affect not only the general 
policy environment on issues such as aid tying, but also decisions on specific 
projects, contract allocations or project design. 
Politiciens and Government 
Turning now to the issue of government leadership, the best approach to follow 
is probably a historical one, and our focus at this stage will be on the 
general objectives of Canadian foreign aid rather than the specifics of the aid 
program itself. 
Foreign policy in the Canadian system of government is the prerogative of 
Cabinet, and it is an area of policy over which the Prime Minister himself 
exercises decisive Influence. Administrative responsibility for most of the aid 
program devolves to CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, whose 
President is a civil servant appointed by the Prime Minister. CIDA itself lies 
under the aegis of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, although there 
is also, since 1984, a junior cabinet position (External Relations) whose 
Minister is directly responsable for the Agency. 
Consultation on matters of aid policy also takes place between government 
departments, both at the Cabinet level and within the civil service. Under the 
Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, who held power for most of 1968-84, aid 
issues reached Cabinet only after having been filtered through a number of 
interdepartmental committees composed of senior bureaucrate. The main bodies 
represented on these committees Included CIDA, External Affairs, Finance, 
Trade, Agriculture, and Treasury Board (Wyse, 1983). Such committees have now 
been disbanded under the Conservatives, but interdepartmental consultation 
continues to take place on a regular If less formai basis. 
Canadian aid firmt developed as a distinct element of Canadian foreign policy 
with the introduction of the Colombo plan in the early 1950s. Canadian 
internationalism was then in its heyday under Louis St. Laurent as Prime 
Minister and Lester Pearson as Secretary of State for External Affairs, and 
this was a period when Canada's political leaders clearly led and helped form 
Canadian public opinion in international matters (Nossal, 1985, pp. 53-60). 
Foreign aid was not a central element of Canadian internationalism at this 
5 According to a Treasury Board study prepared in 1975, the commercial benefits of ald tylng are 
concentrated among a relatively stall number of fins. In the equipaent sector, 23 fias vere found to have 
accounted for 64% of procurement in 1914/75 (calculated froc Canada, Treasury Board, pp. 21 and 29). It vas 
estimated that 28% of equlptent purchases vere cade froc liras dependent opon ald contracta for 10% or tore 
of their sales revenues (Canada, Treasury Board, p. 30). Likevise it vas found that 21 ont of 3$ consulting 
lires studied depended on Canadian aid for at least 5% of their income (pp. 45-6). 
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time, in comparison to Cold War issues and the construction of the United 
Nations system. Foreign aid was of fairly minor proportions, and It was viewed 
as a temporary phenomenon not dissimilar to the Marshall plan (6picer, 1966, 
pp. 11, 95,-103-5). As Spicer puts it, 
Canada launched her development aid programme in 1950 with 
virtually no poli`cy aim beyond a lively anti-Communist instinct 
and an exhilarating vision of a free, multi-racial Commonwealth 
(Spicer, 1966, p. 3). 
Spicer considers strictly developmental objectives to have appeared only later. 
The lag was a short one, however, and humanitarian motives were heavily 
emphasized as the primary justification for foreign aid as early as the mid- 
1950s (Spicer, 6, n. 9). Aid fiows increased rapidly under Pearson's prime- 
ministership (1963-68) (see Figure 1), and foreign aid came to be recognized as 
a permanent feature of Canadian foreign policy. The External Ald office was 
renamed and given new status as the Canadian International Development Agency 
in 1968. According to Thornley, 
[the change] expressed the widespread feeling in Canada - as 
shown by Miles For Millions marches and the strong growth of 
voluntary agencies - that assistance to Third World people should 
be a major national endeavour. It reflected the high priority 
given by the government to international co-operation as a main 
theme in our foreign policy (Thornley, 1979, 27). 
When Pierre Trudeau replaced Lester Pearson as Prime Minister in 1969 he 
reconsidered and challenged Canada's post-war tradition of internationalism in 
world affairs, arguing that it had led to the neglect of Canadian interests in 
matters of foreign policy.6 One would expect henceforth that a different 
balance would be sought between Canada's interests and those of the 
international community. Yet this did not prevent Canada from being responsive 
to the concerns of Third World countries under Trudeau, and the 1970 policy 
document entitled Foreign Police for Canadians was remarkable in fact for the 
serious attention given to aid issues. It also called for substantial 
increases in the share of ODA going to multilateral institutions. Trudeau 
himself was sympathetic to Third World demands, and Canadian positions in 
North-South fora during the 1970s were reflective of this attitude (O'Manique, 
1979; Wood, 1981s). 
6 Forelgn Policy for Canadians, 1970, pp. 5-9. On boy this paper reflected Trudeau's own views, see 
lossal, 1985, pp. 59 and 96-97. 
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Canada's foreign aid objectives as stated in Foreign Policy for Canadians were 
littie different, and not much more precise, than those articulated in previous 
years. The accent remained on economic and social development in developing 
countries as the primary goal of Canadian aid. The paper also insisted that 
the aid program be sensitive and relevant to other Canadian objectives, but 
there was nothing new in this elther. Canadian politicians had always insisted 
that Canada's aid objectives were at once humanitarian, economic and political. 
And Spicer had already considered this refrain a rather tired one as far back 
as the 1960s (Spicer, pp. 4-5). 
Canada's economic and political objectives did, of course, evolve over time. A 
relatively new objective which found voice in Foreign Police for Canadians was 
a desire to project abroad Canada's image as a bilingual and bicultural country 
and to foster new links with francophone countries. This reflected Quebec's 
growing affirmation of Its own identity and interests within the Canadian 
federation in the 1960s. It was both a response to French-Canadian demands 
and, to some extent, the result of infighting between Quebec and Ottawa for 
recognition as the legitimate representative of French-Canadian Interests 
abroad. This shift in focus of Canadian foreign policy led to a strong 
Increase in the amount of aid being directed to francophone countries after 
1970 (see Figure 15). 
Canadian aid had grown rapidly in the second half of the 1960s, and it 
continued to do so after 1970, following the commitment in Foreign Police for 
canadians to moue Canada at an unspecified pace toward the official United 
Nations aid target of 0.7% of GNP. One of the constraints to even faster 
expansion was CIDA's own ability to disburse funds. When Paul Gerin-Lajoie 
took over the presidency of CIDA in 1970, expenditures had fallen well behind 
authorizations, and the backlog represented one of the main criticisms directed 
towards CIDA at the time (Thornley, 28). The speeding up of disbursements was 
thus one of two main goals set by Gerin-Lajoie upon taking over. The other was 
to give new priority to reaching those in greatest need. 
In 1975, the Canadian government published its most comprehensive policy 
statement ever on Canadian aid policy, the Strategy for International 
Development Cooperation. 1975-1980. This statement formalized many of the 
objectives being pursued under Gerin-Lajoie and committed Canada to what was in 
large part a basic-needs orientation to aid policy.7 The Strateav did not 
change the fundamental goals of Canadian ald, but it did elaborate on them and 
specify concrete policy measures and reforms intended to make Canadian aid more 
effective as a development tool. These included such measures as a greater 
degree of untylng for procurement in developing countries, increased support 
for multilateral institutions, greater geographic concentration, more aid to 
the least developed countries of the Third World, and priority to meeting the 
.basic needs of the population. The Strateav also reaffirmed the government's 
determination to move towards the 0.7% target, though still without specifying 
7 Although the Strateav vas approved by Cabinet, It vas largely CIDA's creation, and Its strong 
'developtentalist' tone vas the product of Gerin-Lajoie's activisa In the deter.ination of policy directions 
for Canadian aid (Steeves, 1980, pp. 8-10). 
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any target date.8 The general tone of the 1975 Strategv was one of increasing 
generosity and commitment to development objectives. 
Subsequent events, however, were to turn in a rather different direction. By 
1977, CIDA was showing some of the strains of its rapid expansion in earlier 
years. Criticism of aid mismanagement was widespread in the Canadian media, 
and these criticisms were reinforced by a detailed critical report of the 
Auditor General in 1976. Paul Gerin-Lajoie was replaced as president of CIDA 
by the less messianic career civil-servant Michel Dupuy, whose mandate it was 
to put CIDA In order by emphasizing sound financial management and controls. 
At the saure time, it seems that Gerin-Lajoie's activism in aggressively 
representing the interests of the Third World in interdepartmental committees 
had been frowned upon by other departments desirous of using aid for other 
ends, and Prime Minister Trudeau made a point of instructing Dupuy to cooperate 
with other departments (Wyse, p. 28). 
The harsh economic climate of the late 1970s also had implications for the aid 
program, leading to aid cutbacks in 1978-79, and to an increased emphasis on 
the economic benefits which Canada might derive from her aid. In a paper 
titled "Directions for the Agency", Dupuy established the principle of 'mutual 
benefits' as a guideline for CIDA, amplifying that 
the recent evolution of the Canadian economy as well as its short 
and medium term prospects require that CIDA strive to ensure that 
its activities maintain or generate employment and economic 
benefits in our own country. We must also aim at strengthening 
mutually beneficial bilateral relationships between our 
developing partners and Canada. This goal must be achieved while 
not neglecting our essential mandate which is international 
development (cited from Wood, 1982, p. 95). 
"By mid-1978" writes Pratt, "the Cabinet had agreed that Canada's primary 
interests in relations with developing countries were economic and that as far 
as possible, increased emphasis should be placed on the systematic expansion of 
Canada's economic relations with a limited number of large and fairly wealthy 
developing countries" (Pratt, 1984, 46). 
One must be careful in interpreting these statements. Canadian trade with some 
of the farter growing less developed countries increased rapidly during the 
1960s and 1970s, and It was to be expected that increased importance should 
eventually be given to that aspect of Canada's relationship with the Third 
World. Cabinet's expression of interest in trade with less developed countries 
as cited by Pratt was thus quite understandable, though it does not necessarily 
imply a decision to use foreign aid primarily for the purpose of trade 
promotion. It is our understanding that Dupuy's emphasis on short-term 
economic benefits was considered by Cabinet to be too extreme, and official 
rhetoric has subsequently tended to play down the concept of 'mutual benefits' 
8 According to the $orth-South Institute, 1979, p. 114, the Intention vas to reach the .7% target by 
1979-80. 
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in favour of 'mutual interdependence', with greater emphasis on long-term 
rather than immediate benefits for Canada. These caveats notwithstanding, 
there is general agreement that the late 1970s witnessed a shift of attention 
in government thinking away from the strong concern for growth and the 
Increased developmental effectiveness of aid which was evident in the early and 
mid-1970s towards a more commercially-oriented focus. 
In the early 1980s, there were Indications that some of the developmental 
momentum lost in recent years might be regained. In the wake of the Brandt 
report, Trudeau recovered some of his earlier interest in the Third World, and 
he emerged briefly as a spokesman for the Third World at the Ottawa summit of 
1981 and the Cancun conference in Mexico. Canada continued to express a 
special commitment towards the poorest countries, and it was instrumental in 
achieving a consensus among the aid donors to commit .15% of GNP to 37 'Least 
Developed' countries in 1982 (CIDA Annual Review, 1981-82, p. 4). 
It was at this time also that the Trudeau government finally committed itself 
to a specific date for meeting the .7% aid-to-GNP target established by the 
United Nations. The target would be met in two stages, reaching .5% by 1985 
and .7% by 1990. The first target was a modest one and has since been met, but 
harsh economic times and government cutbacks have made a shambles of the latter 
target. It has been revised and postponed on several occasions and the 
Mulroney government's February 1986 budget all but buried Canada's commitment 
to the .7% target for the time being. Aid is to remain at .5% until 1990, 
which means that it will grow at the same pace as GNP. It is now scheduled to 
Increase to .6% of GNP by 1995 and .7% by the year 2000. Despite these 
cutbacks In projected growth, it should be noted that foreign aid Is one of 
only two budget items - the other being defence - to be growing at all in real 
terms under the present government's policy of fiscal restraint. 
The increased commercial focus of Canadian aid in the late 1970s has remained 
as a dimension of Canadian aid policy since that time, intensified in the 1980s 
by the growing pressure of double-digit unemployment.9 Government 
pronouncements reflect this orientation. It is evident for instance in CIDA's 
Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strateav. 1984, which 
displays substantially more awareness of commercial issues than did the 1975 
Strateuv. It is evident also in the government's retreat from the 1975 
commitment to partially untie bilateral aid. 
Both the Liberal and Conservative governments have stated a preference for 
continued tying in the 1980s through the pronouncements of Marcel Massé, 
President of CIDA between 1980 and 1983, and the current President, Margaret 
Catley-Carson. Catley-Carson has been a vigorous defender of the aid-trade 
connection. Her original mandate included instructions to "sell" the concept of 
foreign aid to the Canadian public, and like Massé before her, she considers a 
commercial return for Canada as an important selling point. That point of view 
was more than shared by Monique Vezina, Minister for External Relations 
immediately responsible for CIDA during the first two years of Bilan Mulroney's 
9 On the increasingly couercial orientation of foreign policy generally in the 1980s, see Freeaan 
(1985) and Rudner (1984). 
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Conservative government (September 1984 to June 1986). Vezina had a substantial 
impact upon the Agency with her views about increasing the role of private 
business in Canadian aid. Her concerns were not only to secure commercial 
benefits for Canada but also, and perhaps predominantly, to enhance the 
positive role which she believed the private sector could play in the 
development process (Ottawa Citizen, 1 February 1986). Vezina was assigned to a 
more senior cabinet post in June 1986, to be replaced by ex-businesswoman 
Monique Landry who has, so far, expressed herself in much the saure terms as 
Vezina. One of the notable features of recent reorganizations In CIDA was the 
creation of a new Business Cooperation Branch In 1984 to manage relations with 
the private sector In aid-related matters. 
Other pronouncements reflecting the desire to use aid for commercial purposes 
have included the announcement of a new "Aid-Trade Fund" in the Liberal 
government's Budget Speech of February 1984. The Intent was to divert up to 
one-half of proposed increases in Canadian aid to a commercially-responsive 
facility whose funds would be blended with those of the Export Development 
Corporation in order to provide concessional financing for Canadian exports. 
This new concept was latex ratified by the new Conservative government, which 
rechristened it as the "Trade and Development Facility" in the May 1985 budget. 
It was subsequently abandoned in February 1986, following cutbacks in proposed 
growth of the aid budget. 
To say that commercial objectives have received increased attention is not to 
suggest that they have become the yrimarv focus of Canadian aid. That is a 
question better left for latex, following detailed review of how the aid 
program has evolved in practice. However it is worth noting at this point that 
official statements regarding the objectives of Canadian aid have themselves 
changed very little over the years, and continue to identify developmental 
concerns as primary. The statement by Michel Dupuy quoted above stands out by 
the emphasis given to Canadian commercial interests, but elsewhere, commercial 
interests receive no more than a passing mention, and allusion to those 
interests in quite tentative. Here is how the objectives of Canadian aid are 
presented in the 1986-87 Estimated of expenditures presented to Parliament in 
February, 1986 (Part III, p. 20): 
...to facilitate the efforts of the people of developing 
countries to achieve self-sustainable economic and social 
development in accordance with their needs and environment, by 
cooperating with them in development activities; and to provide 
humanitarian assistance; thereby contributing to Canada's 
political and economic interests abroad In promoting social 
justice, international stability and long-term economic 
relationships, for the benefit of the global community. 
Internationalist concerns thus remain clearly central and primary in Canada's 
declared objectives for the aid program. The more elaborate statement of 
objectives to be found in Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance 
Strategy, 1984'reflects the same general orientation. 
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Party politics have played a limited yole in the evolution of Canadian aid 
policy. The Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau held power during most of the 
period under discussion (1968-1984, with a 9-month interregnum in 1980), and It 
was vert' mach Trudeau, within the government, who set the tope for Canada's 
foreign policy. The intensity which which internationalist objectives were 
pursued under Trudeau was itself dependent on the ebb and flow of the Liberal 
party's political fortune during that time, and one finds periods of political 
and economic difficulty (1972-74, 1977-79 and 1982-84) to be associated with a 
decreased focus on development issues In governement statements and speeches 
(Fleming and Keenleyside, 1983, p. 20). 
The Conservatives, who took power briefly in 1980 under Joe Clark and who have 
governed Canada now since September 1984, have retained the internationalist 
orientation of Canada's foreign policy. Policy thrusts consistent with that 
orientation have included continued active support for the United Nations, a 
strong role in the African drought relief effort, and activism within the 
Commonwealth in the matter of South African sanctions; and the government 
declared in December 1986 that it "accepts with enthusiasm the theme of active 
internationalism" (Canada's International Relations, 1986). Canadian aid 
policy has probably become more commercially-oriented under the Conservatives 
than it vas under the Liberals, but this is more a matter of emphasis than a 
major qualitative change. 
The other major political party on the Canadian scene Is the social democratic 
NDP (New Democratic Party). The NDP has tended to advocate a more generous aid 
policy for Canada, including rapid movement towards the .7% target and greater 
untying of Canadian aid. The NDP's Influence on the government is largest when 
neither of the two major parties holds a majority of seats in Parliament, but 
majority government has been the rule by far rather than the exception in the 
1970s and 1980s. The party's spokesmen have had some influence through the 
parliamentary committees and task forces which advise the government on foreign 
policy matters, as have members of the two langer parties. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this section has been to review the expressed attitudes of 
Canadians and the Canadian government on the subject of foreign aid. It is 
clear that the vast majority of Canadians support the concept of foreign aid, 
and that they support it mainly as a response to income disparities between 
North and South. Most Canadians also seem to favour increased aid flows over 
time, although there is a strong element of incrementalism evident here. Elite 
group responses, which are of particular importance, tend to be substantially 
more generous on such matters than the public at large. 
In ternis of the classification of objectives introduced in section II, support 
of foreign aid seems to be based very clearly on internationalist objectives. 
Canadians percelve foreign ald as an International public good and are prepared 
to support It on that basis. Many Canadians nonetheless feel that Canada 
should also derive some national benefit from its aid, and tying is strongly 
supported by the influential business community. 
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These various perceptions of foreign aid find an unmistakable echo in Canadian 
government pronouncements regarding the objectives of Canadian aid. Priority 
for internationalist objectives, incrementalism, and 'mutual benefits' are all 
clearly evident in the government statements reviewed in this section. How 
accurately this rhetoric reflects itself in reality is another question. One 
must not neglect the possibility that the rhetoric is insincere or that special 
interests such as Canadian business might be capable of usurping foreign aid 
for their own ends. How, in practice, has Canadian aid gone about resolving 
the possible contradiction between its stated internationalist goals and more 
narrow national goals? What is the evidence, again in practice, of a decline 
in the internationalist thrust of Canadian aid in the last ten years or so? 
These are the questions to which we turn in the following section. 
III. THE AID PROGRAN 
Aid policy embodies a number of dimensions, including the amount of aid to be 
provided, the ternis on which it is given, the choice of delivery channels, and 
the choice of recipient countries or institutions. Further choices have to be 
made within recipient countries with regard to the types of uses to which the 
aid will be put; and a donor must also provide for an administrative structure 
to manage ail this. All these dimensions together constitute what is called 
aid policy, and each of these dimensions will be considered to some degree in 
the present section. 
Volume and Terras 
One of the conclusions to corne out of the review of public opinion in the 
previous section Is that Canadians have been reasonably well-disposed towards 
foreign aid and generally prepared to accept moderate increases in aid flows 
over time. It should therefore not be surprising that Canadian aid has 
increased over the years. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows that budgetary 
appropriations of aid as a share of GNP increased most rapidly during Lester 
Pearson's prime ministership from 1963-68 and through the first two years of 
the Trudeau government which followed. The ratio of aid to GNP rose from .16% 
in 1963 to .44% in 1970.10 Aid appropriations subsequently grew much more 
slowly, however, and certainly much more slowly than government commitments had 
indicated they would. At one point, between 1977 and 1980, growth actually gave 
way to decline, so that appropriations fell by about 5% in absolute terms after 
discounting for Inflation. By 1980, the ratio of ODA to GNP had fallen back to 
.425%, a level below that attained in 1970. Following renewed growth in 
10 Unless othervise indicated, all ald statistics in this section are taken or calculated froc sources 
indicated in the notes to Figures 1 to 11. These data are identical to OECD def initions as used in reports 
of the OECD's Develop.ent Assistance Couittee, except that they are by fiscal year rather than by calendar 
year. The fiscal year in Canada runs froc April 1 to March 31. la the interests of readability, fiscal year 
1970-71 is referred to here siiply as 1970, and this shorthand fort viii be used throughout in the text. 
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appropriations after 1980, the ratio of ODA to GNP crept back, nonetheless, to 
a new high of .50 in 1985.11 
Canada today is neither particularly generous nor particularly tight-fisted in 
its aid allocations. Its ODA/GNP ratio is higher than the weighted average for 
DAC countries as a group (.50 compared to the DAC average of .36 in the 1984 
calendar year), and it ranks eighth out of the 17 donor countries on the saure 
criterion (OECD, 1985, p. 295). 
The ternis of Canadian aid are very soft, and they are consistent In this 
respect with the declared humanitarian objectives of the program. As Figure 3 
shows, there Is a trend for Canada's aid Increasingly to take the form of 
grants. We see there that 90% of Canadian aid was given in grant form in 1983, 
up from a low of 65% In 1971. The Test is offered under conditions so soft 
that they are essentially grants anyway. The "grant element" of Canadian aid 
has been above 96% every year since 1970 (OECD, Development Cooperation, 
various issues). It was announced in 1986 that all Canadian aid will 
henceforth be given in the form of grants. 
Multilateral Flows 
The split between multilateral and bilateral aid in the Canadian case is about 
one third/two thirds (see Table 1 and Figure 4), the share of multilateral aid 
being larger than that of most OECD donors (OECD, 1985, p. 147). Support for 
multilateral aid agencies in Canada reflects a longstanding tradition of 
support for international institutions generally - both in and out of the aid 
field. This is a logical policy for a middle power like Canada which is too 
small to have much of an impact on world affairs when acting alone but large 
enough to have an influence in how international institutions operate. Canada's 
middle power status is of obvious relevance to an understanding of its 
contributions to the various multilateral development banks. As Isbister points 
out, Canada is large enough to ensure that Canadians sit on the board of 
directors of all the development banks, but it cannot afford to let its 
contributions slip if it is to maintain that position (1986, p. 15). 
The main recipients of Canadian multilateral aid include the World Bank and the 
varlous Regional Development Banks, the United Nations Development Program, and 
the World Food Program (see Table 1). As Figure 4 shows, the share of Canadian 
ODA being channeled through such agencies has usually ranged between 35% and 
40% since 1975, with some decline becoming apparent after 1978. The largest 
shift in favour of multilateral aid was made between 1970 and 1976, when the 
multilateral share of Canadian ODA more than doubled, going from 19.8% to 44.0% 
of the total (see Figure 4). This increase was consistent with the commitment 
11 lote that appropriations and disburseaents folloved soaevhat different grorth patterns in the 1910s 
(disborseaent data are skovn in Figure 2). CIDA enjoyed the special privilege of non-lapsinq fondinq outil 
1977-70, and ODA disborseaent trends tended to be affected by the ability of CIDA to disborse the fonds 
allocated to it. Becanse of the lag involved, the grovth of disbarseaents substantially outpaced that of 
appropriations betveen 1970 and 1975 as disbarseaents ate into the backlog of accuaulated appropriations fro 
the 1960s. Disburseaents to GNP reached a peak of .53% in 1975. Ve have used data on appropriations rather 
than disbarseaents since these are probably a better reflection of Cabinet's intentions at each moment. 
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made to that effect in Foreign Policy for Canadians in 1970. Indeed it 
exceeded those commitments by quite a wide margin. The reasons for this was 
partly a logistical one, however, since a shift of aid to multilateral agencies 
was perceived as a convenient and efficient way to increase disbursements at a 
time when CIDA was finding it difficult to manage the increased appropriations 
being allocated to It. With aid levels being cut back, and with the increased 
concern for 'mutual benefits' in the latter quarter of the 1970s, CIDA found 
itself under Cabinet pressure to reduce the share of multilateral aid in favour 
of bilateral aid, and multilateral aid disbursements declined In real terms by 
14.0% between 1978 and 1984. 
Trends in Canadian multilateral contributions cannot be understood exclusively 
In terms of domestic considerations, however, since contributions to 
multilateral agencies are multilaterally negotiated among donors. The key 
concept in such negotiations Is that of 'burden sharing,' the burden being the 
loss of national benefits accruing to donors when ald is provided through 
multilateral rather than bilateral channels. Trends in multilateral aid are 
thus best discussed in an International context. It is surely not pure 
coincidence that the large increase in multilateral flows observed for Canada 
in the early 1970s occurred in similar fashion for a wide range of donors. For 
DAC donors as a group, the share of ODA being distributed through multilateral 
agencies rose from 16.6% to 30.4% between 1970 and 1976, henceforth to 
stabilize much as It did in Canada (Stokke, 34; see also OECD, 1985, pp. 140- 
4). This was to some extent a response to the 1969 recommendation of the 
Pearson Commission that multilateral aid should be increased to 30% of total 
ODA, and it may be noted in this regard that the Pearson report had a special 
impact on Canadian opinion because of former Prime Minister Lester Pearson's 
yole as Chairman of that Commission. The recommendations of the Pearson 
Commission were given substance in 1970 when DAC members agreed at a high- 
level meeting in Tokyo that contributions to multilateral institutions should 
be increased (OECD, 1985, p. 75), and the increase in Canada's own 
contributions must be understood in that context. This is not to deny 
Canada;'s special interest in the multilateral framework. As noted above, 
Canada does give a langer than average share of its aid through multilateral 
channels, and while Canada has been influenced by international agreements, it 
has also played a leadership yole in obtaining such agreements. 
The largest recipient of Canadian multilateral aid Is the World Bank's soft- 
loan window, the International Development Agency (IDA), which was created In 
1960. Contributions to IDA increased rapidly in the 1960s and continued to do 
so up to 1978, after which there was a rather substantial decline in real 
terms, (after discounting for inflation) from $91 million in 1978 to $56 
million in 1984 (all in 1983 dollars). This decline in fact accounts for 
virtually all the reduction in the real value of Canadian multilateral 
contributions since 1978, and it must itself be understood in an international 
context. Like other donors, Canada is committed to the concept of burden- 
sharing with regard to international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the regional development banks (Canada, 1986-87 Estimates, Part III). 
Following the 1980 agreement for the sixth IDA replenishment, Canada committed 
itself to providing an average of just over $200 million per year to IDA 
between 1980-81 and 1982-83 (World Bank, Annual Report 1980, pp. 11-13). In 
nominal terras, this represented roughly a 22% increase over the amount provided 
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in 1979-80. In real terras, it meant that contributions after discounting for 
inflation would remain approximately constant. 
This commit-ment was not realized, however, and IDA contributions have fallen 
steadily in real ternis, to the point where they were 31% lover in 1984 than In 
1979. These cutbacks In IDA were the result of cutbacks In U.S. contributions 
combined with the reluctance of other donors to abandon traditional burden- 
sharing arrangements. Some special arrangements were nonetheless made to 
rescue IDA from the financial straits in which It soon found Itself. The most 
important of these was negotiated in 1982 and involved special contributions by 
all donors except the United States. Canada's own share ($163 million U.S.) 
vas the third largest of these special contributions, accounting for 8.6% of 
the total, or twice the share it had accepted to bear under IDA-6. Canada was 
part of a group of countries that insisted that the proceeds of their special 
contribution not be used for procurement In the U.S. (World Bank, Annual Report 
1982,, pp. 15-16 and Annual Report 1983, pp. 13-18). Negotiations for IDA-7 in 
1983 and 1984 were very difficult in the face of U.S. recalcitrance, and the 
agreement finally negotiated In 1984 involved further cutbacks in IDA funds 
(World Bank, Annual Report 1984. pp. 15-22). It was expected that additional 
special contributions' would be made by subgroups of donors. One such 
agreement, the US$1.1 billion 'Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa', was in 
fact signed in early 1985, with Canada participating In the amount of US$75 
million. 
There are two other main categories of recipients of Canadian multilateral aid. 
The first is the World Food Program, which has consistently received about 20% 
of Canada's multilateral contributions since 1966. Those original 
contributions were motivated in large part by the abundance of wheat stocks at 
the time (Wyse, p. 13; Williams and Young, p. 337), but considerable importance 
appears to have been given to the continuity of the relationship since that 
time. World cereal markets became increasingly tight in the early 1970s, and 
contributions to the World Food Program declined relative to the peak reached 
in 1969, but the period was also witness to serious food shortages, and Canada 
responded to the crisis with a major three-year commitment at the World Food 
Conference in 1974. As a result, Canadian contributions to the WFP rose from 
$15 to $99 million between 1974 and 1975. Contributions since 1975 have as a 
result been well above those made in the first half of the 1970s or late 1960s. 
The other major category of multilateral recipient is that represented by the 
various regional development banks. Contributions to the Asian Development 
Bank began in 1966 and have remained quite significant since that time, 
accounting for 11.9% of Canadian multilateral assistance between 1980 and 1984. 
Contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and the African 
Development Bank both began in the early 1970s, and they accounted respectively 
for 4.2% and 6.6% of multilateral assistance between 1980 and 1984. Canada has 
thus maintained a visible and relatively important presence in each of the 
major regional development banks. 
The Growth of Non-Traditional Channels in the 1970s and 1980s 
Most Canadian aid is provided through bilateral channels. These have the 
advantage of keeping control of the funds in Canadian hands and making the 
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source of the funds identifiably Canadian within recipient countries. The 
funds can be tied to Canadian procurement, and they can be used in support of 
foreign policy objectives In recipient countries. Traditional government-to- 
government-aid remains the most important of the varlous bilateral channels, 
accounting for 43.7% of Canadian ODA in 1984, but other, more Indirect, 
bilateral channels are increasingly being used, Including Non-Government 
Organizations (9.3%), the International Development Research Centre (3.8%), 
Petro-Canada International (2.6%) and the Industrial Cooperation program 
(1.9%). Figures 4 through 6 illustrate how use of these different channels has 
evolved over the years. They also show the declining share of government-to- 
government aid in ODA, due first to the rapid growth of disbursements to 
multilateral Institutions in the early and mid-1970s, and later to the growth 
of other channels such as NGOs and IDRC. Government-to-government aid thus 
fell from 76% of the total In 1970 to 56% in 1975 and oniy 44% in 1984. 
The most important of the alternatives to government-to-government aid is the 
NGO mechanism. Official Canadian aid is channeled to the Third World by way of 
Non-Government Organizations through CIDA's Special Programs Branch, with 
provides funds to NGOs on a matching grants basis in accordance with private 
sector and local contributions raised by the NGO. A the sort of development 
projects which governments often ignore, or are not equipped to undertake," and 
they are perceived to do so with "far greater efficiency, flexibility, speed 
and economy than governments" (Canada, Partners in Tomorrow, p. 10). 
Such perceptions of the role of NGOs are widely shared, both in Canada and 
abroad (OECD, 1981), and it is in large part this perceived effectiveness of 
the NGO channel which explains Its rapid and continued growth over the last 
decade and a half, as shown in Figure 6. NGOs themselves have, of course, been 
active In promoting such perceptions of effectiveness, and their lobbying 
efforts, alluded to in Section II, have tended to focus to a degree on matters 
having direct financial implications for the NGO sector (Clark, 1985). 
Systematic research on the effectiveness of NGOs is lacking, although the 
North-South country studies on Bangladesh, Haiti and Senegal did tend to 
confirm conventional perceptions. The North-South Institute is presently 
involved in a two year program of evaluation whose preliminary results appear 
to be relatively favourable (North-South News, Fall, 1986). 
The growth of IDRC can also be understood primarily in terms of perceived needs 
in the Third World. IDRC's genesis goes back to the last half of the 1960s and 
was a response to the personal initiative of Maurice Strong after he became 
Director-General of the External Aid Office in 1966. Following consultation 
with a large number of international bodies, a Steering Committee reported in 
1968 that there was an urgent international need for additional development 
research, and that Canada was exceptionally well placed to provide it (Plumtre, 
1975, p. 155). IDRC was established in 1970 and is autonomously run by an 
international Board of Governors of which just over half must be Canadian. It 
is dedicated to supporting scientific and technical research which is not only 
located in developing countries and designed for their benefit, but also for 
the most part initiated and carried out by Third World scientists. The funds 
themselves are untied. This is not to suggest that IDRC remains totally 
outside the influence of Its funding body, the Canadian government. Manuge 
(1982) describes some of the lapses in autonomy which have manifested 
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themselves since 1977. The Centre's independence nonetheless remains very high 
and its development mandate quite unambiguous. IDRC's share of Canadian ODA 
has tended to increase over time, with some slowdown in growth taking place 
after 1976-(see Figure 6). 
The other channels mentioned above were Petro-Canada International and the 
Industrial Cooperation program. These channels became significant only in the 
1980s and remain fairly small. these two channels reflect a greater commercial 
orientation than the previous two. 
This is most evident for the Industrial Cooperation program, which Is designed 
to provide support for private sector initiatives Involving Canadian firms in 
investment, joint ventures or transfers of technology in Third World markets. 
The program has existed since 1971 but has recently been given increased 
importance. Funding for the program was increased by two thirds In 1984. The 
growth of this program explicitly reflects a desire to use aid for commercial 
purposes (Canada, Canadian Business and the Third World, p. 5), but it also 
reflects a shift in development ideology among donor agencies favouring greater 
support for the private sector as an agent of growth in the context of the 
economic crisis still afflicting much of the Third World (OECD, 1985, p. 64). 
This ideological focus is quite evident in the World Bank's Development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action and in USAID initiatives undertaken under 
President Reagan. 
The Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation (PCIAC) is an 
independently managed subsidiary of Petro-Canada, a Canadian crown corporation, 
charged with financing and managing aid projects in the oil and gas sector. 
Aid funds provided through PCIAC are not rigidly tied to Canadian procurement, 
but PCIAC is nonetheless instructed to make use predominantly of Canadian goods 
and services. Aid projects funded through Petro-Canada International serve to 
showcase Canadian oil and gas technology, with possible commercial spin-offs in 
the long run (PCIAC, Annual Report, 1984). At the saine time, PCIAC's main goal 
is the developmental one of helping to increase oil and gas production In oil- 
importing Third World countries in order thereby to reduce their dependency on 
energy Imports. It was created in 1982 when world oil prices were at 
historical peak levels and when energy problems In the Third World were most 
acute. It was introduced as the international component of Canada's National 
Energy Program, subsequent to the failure of the Canadian-supported Initiative 
to establish an Energy Affiliate to the World Bank. 
Geographical Distribution of Bilateral Flows 
One of the most revealing dimensions of a country's aid policy is the 
geographical distribution of disbursements, because one would predict quite 
different patterns depending on whether aid is given primarily for 
developmental, commercial or political purposes. 
The country selection process for Canadian bilateral aid differs according to 
each of the different aid channels being used, as do the criteria for 
allocating disbursements among countries. Special Programs Branch does not, for 
instance, have a geographical approach, since it is primarily responsive to the 
initiatives of the NGO community. IDRC also allocates its aid according to 
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non-geographical criteria, and the Centre itself is administered according to 
areas of research specialization (primarily Agriculture, Health, and Social 
Sciences). Some effort is made nonetheless to retain a regional balance, and 
IDRC has regional offices in Bogota, Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi, New Delhi, and 
Singapore. Petro-Canada International and the Industrial Cooperation Program 
are similarly guided more by their specific mandates than by any particular 
geographical focus. 
Government-to-Government aid, on the other hand, Is organized into four 
regional areas of concentration: Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa, Asia, 
and the Amexicas. Each of there regional branches is organized around a number 
of country desks, of which there are now 30. Most desks are responsible for one 
or two of the 31 recipient countries assigned 'core' status by the Agency, 
along with some of the lower recipient-status countries classified as 'non- 
core' or 'visible presence' countries. Countries not belonging to these three 
categories of recipients are classified either as not eligible (Cuba, Laos, 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Iran and Libya) or as non-recipients (a larger 
group of about 30 higher Income LDCs and dependencies located mostly in the 
Middle East and Europe). Cabinet has decided that core countries should receive 
75% of Canadian bilateral funds, leaving 20% for non-core countries and 5% for 
the visible presence countries. 
Assignment of countries to each category is the prerogative of Cabinet, as is 
the assignment of 'Indicative Planning Figures' intended to serve as country- 
specific budgets over a five-year planning period. A large number of 
eligibility criteria are considered, including the level of development of the 
recipient country, its "commitment to development," its human rights record, 
and its absorptive capacity, along with various political and commercial 
considerations of special interest to Canada (Canada, "Briefing Book for 
Parliamentarians," p. 46). Some indication of the relative priority of each 
criterion has been provided by the use of a point system in which "need" has 
been allocated 5 points out of 10; "commitment to development and human rights" 
3 points; and diplomatic, cultural and commercial relations with Canada the 
remaining 2 points (Task Force on Canada's ODA Program, 1986, p. 46). 
Continuity in aid relationships with recipients is also an important criterion, 
though it is less often mentioned explicitly. One finds very few cases of 
sudden shifts In policy towards a recipient country. The few examples which 
come to mind include Uganda under Amin, Cuba after Cuban troops were sent to 
Angola, India after the explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, and Guatemala 
following widespread human rights abuses in the 1980s. 
Cabinet decided as far back as 1975 that 80% of Canadian bilateral assistance 
should go to low-income countries (now defined as countries with per capita 
incomes of less that U.S. $625 in 1978). A subtarget of .15% of GNP to the 
Least Developed group of countries (LLDCs) was added to this in 1982 following 
an international commitment to that effect (Canada, Elements, p. 10). 
Table 2 in the Appendix identifies the major countries which have received 
Canadian bilateral aid for each five year period since 1960. Total bilateral 
flows are shown here under the title "C-C," representing the words "Country-to- 
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Country". Separate figure are also provided for government-to-government flows 
for the years 1980-84. 
It becomes-evident from the long list of countries that Canadian bilateral aid 
is highly dispersed. A total of 125 countries or groups of countries received 
Canadian government-to-government assistance between 1980 and 1984. Most of 
these recipients received fairly small amounts of aid, but this left 36 
beneficiaries in receipt of $20 million or more over the five year period.12 
The relatively high degree of dispersion which this represents is contrary to 
the objective of greater resource concentration established in the 1975 
Strateav, and it undoubtedly involves some loss of developmental effectiveness 
for the Canadian aid program. 
Dispersal of government-to-government aid does have political advantages to 
offer however. Different groups of Canadians ail have countries which they 
particularly would like to support and others which they would particularly 
like to avoid. Spreading aid relatively thinly over a large number of countries 
allows the government to satisfy as large a constituency as possible without 
unduly antagonizing any one group. In classic Canadian tradition, there is 
something there for everyone. A dispersed pattern of aid distribution also 
allows Canada to maintain an aid presence in as many countries as possible, 
thus avoiding unhappiness among potential recipient countries who might 
otherwise have to be turned down. 
Figures 7 through 17 and Tables 3 to 5 illustrate the distribution of Canadian 
by different groups of countries and the different trends evident since the 
early years of Canadian assistance to developing countries. 
Figures 7 to 10 detail how Canadian bilateral aid has been distributed to 
various income groups of countries. Countries are grouped here in such a way 
that the composition of each group remains constant over time, according to 
each country's per capita income in 1970 (a year for which GNP statistical 
series were particularly complete). India's per capita income was exactly $100 
U.S. in that year, while the weighted average income for all LDCs was $223 U.S. 
Figures 7 to 9 show data on the share of Canadian aid accruing to what may be 
labeled the lower income group of countries: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
other countries with per capita incomes below $200 U.S. (Bangladesh and 
Pakistan are shown together in order to maintain a constant time series in 
spite of the breakup of Pakistan into two countries in 1971). Taking 1980 as a 
fairly typical year for the recent period, we find that 71% of Canadian aid 
12 Governsent-to-governtent disburseaents vere made as follovs: 15% to the top 22 recipients, 20% to 
the next 30, 4% to the next 20, and the last 1% to a large group of 53 recipients. ten of the categories 
consisted of groups of countries, so that an exact count of the nuaber of countries assisted is not possible. 
For a co.parison of the geographical dispersion of ald as betveen different donor countries, see OECD, 1985, 
table 12. 
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went to these low-income countries. The figure rises to 88% if one includes 
those near-average countries in the $200-$300 dollar range.13 
Using the définition of low-income countries used by CIDA (less that $625 U.S. 
per capita in 1978), we find an average 83% of government-to-government aid 
being directed to low income countries between 1981 and 1985. The objective of 
targeting 80% of bilateral aid to this group of countries is thus evidently 
being met.14 Bilateral aid to LLDCs in 1980 stood at 35% of the total, or .13% 
of GNP once an appropriate share of multilateral assistance is added In, and 
Canada is thus still falling somewhat short of the .15% target established for 
this group of countries. 
Table 3 shows the amount of Canadian bilateral aid received per capita for 
different income groups of countries. With the notable exception of India, 
Canadian aid per capita tends to be substantially higher for low income 
countries than for higher income countries. Aid per capita in 1980 was highest 
for Bangladesh and Pakistan ($.86 and $.50 respectively) and for countries in 
the range of $50-100 per capita ($.43). It tended to be much lower for the 
higher income LDCs ($.21 for the $300-600 group). However it was only $.05 for 
India, the second largest of the low income countries (after China). 
Looking at how the distribution of Canadian aid has evolved over the last 
twenty years, it is the steady deterioration in India's share which stands out 
most starkly. Canadian aid to India on a per capita basis In 1983 was less 
than haif what it was in 1970. In constant dollar tenus, it was only one 
eight as high. Figures 8 to 10 show that the decline in India's share of 
Canadian aid was matched by an Increase in the share of every other recipient 
group. Most of the redistribution away from India was accomplished in favour 
of countries which were as poor or poorer than India. Taking 1968 as a base, 
and comparing with 1983, one finds India's declining share being redistributed 
26% in favour of Bangladesh and Pakistan and 33 percent in favour of countries 
in the $50-100 range, for a total of 59%. This is reflected in the growing 
share of aid going to Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) which is evident in 
Figure 11. Another 9.4% went to countries in the $100-200 range, while the 
remaining 32% went to countries which were quite a bit better off than India on 
the criterion of income per capita. 
Figure 12 illustrates the effect of these trends on the average income of 
countries receiving Canadian aid relative to the average income of all 
developing countries. This ratio increased from a low of .57 on average 
between 1951 and 1959 to a peak of .85 In 1970, in response to the 
diversification of Canadian aid away from South Asia. The average income of 
13 This $300 U.S. cut off point correspond very closely to the definition of a lov incole country used 
by CIDA. Adjusting for the growth of per capita incomes in the Third World and for inflation of the U.S. 
dollar (using the U.S. GDP index), the 1918 figure of $625 U.S. being used by CIDA corresponds to a figure of 
approxiiately $295 U.S. In 1910. 
14 Data obtained froc CIDA. Ve vere unable to obtain data on total bilateral flous (as opposed to the 
governaent-to-governaent portion only, bat there Is no reason to expect Chat the results vould differ very 
iuch as betveen these tvo data sertes. 
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recipients declined again after 1970, reaching an average of .72 between 1980 
and 1983. 
In geographtical terms, we see aid shifting away from India, mainly towards 
Africa but also towards Latin America and other Asian countries. These trends 
are shown in Figure 7 to 8 and 13 to 15. In recent years about 45% of Canadian 
aid has been directed to Africa, this amount divided in about equal proportion 
between francophone and anglophone countries. Latin America and the Caribbean 
have taken up about 12%, and the Test has gone to Asian countries, notably 
Bangladesh and Pakistan which together have absorbed about 20% of the total. 
Why the steady decline in India's share of Canadian foreign aid? Some 
diversification away from India after the early years of concentration on that 
country was to be expected, but this does not explain the absolute decline in 
aid to that country, nor the fact that aid per capita is lower in India than in 
any other country group. No doubt there are a number of explanatory factors, 
and these are difficult to disentangle. The tendency for aid per capita to be 
low for large recipient countries such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines 
is a well known phenomenon in the donor community as a whole and does not apply 
only to Canada (see Dudley and Monmarquette, pp. 62-63 for references; see 
Burki, p. 140 for 1980 OECD data). Yet there is no pervasive bias in Canadian 
aid policy against large countries. Witness the large amounts of Canadian aid 
per capita being received by Pakistan and Bangladesh.15 
Notwithstanding the fact that India's exceptionally large size places it in a 
category of Its own - along with China - there are a variety of other factors 
which help to explain the low and declining amount of aid it has received from 
Canada. These include the strongly self-reliant approach to development 
adopted by India, and its own policy after 1966 of reducing its dependence on 
Western foreign assistance (Morrison, p. 24). As India became securely 
established as a nation-state after the mid-1960s attention shifted to helping 
consolidate the newly independent nations of Africa and the Caribbean; and 
India's growing ability to feed itself following the Green Revolution has also 
been a factor, shifting food aid away from India towards Africa and Bangladesh 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
An important event in the history of Canadian aid to India was the explosion of 
a nuclear device by that country in 1974. Canada had assisted in the 
development of India's nuclear energy program and India's use of its nuclear 
capabilities for the development of a nuclear bomb was perceived in Canada as a 
serious breech of agreement between the two countries. Canada's response was 
to immediately curtail the aid program to India. Ongoing projects were allowed 
to continue, but a halt was placed on new interventions. This led to a strong 
decline in disbursements to India between 1975 and 1978 as shown in Figure 7. 
15 The econotetric results shovn in Dudley and Moniarquette (pp. 18-90) and in 9encivenga (annex tables) 
conflit the Jack of any stronq relationship betveen aid receipts and the population of the recipient 
countries. Dudley and Moniarquette's results suggest that large countries are more likely tu be eligible for 
Canadian Materai ald bot do tend to recelve somevhat less ald on a per capita basas once the selection of 
recipient countries bas been made. Hovever, neither result vas statistically significant at the .05 level 
for the average year betveen 1912 and 1974. 
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Remaining constraints on the aid program were finally removed in 1979, but 
disbursement levels to India have never fully recovered. 
Canadian aid is concentrated not only on poorer developing countries, but also 
and perhaps especially on those whose growth rates are low. The shares of aid 
going to low and high growth rate recipients are shown In Figures 16 and 17, 
and the per capita aid figures are shown in Table 4. One pets much the same 
type of picture as before, with per capita aid figures being substantially 
higher in low growth countries and with the share of all groups Increasing over 
time except for India's. The share going to high growth countries has 
increased the least over time, and since 1978 the tendency has been for the 
share of medium and high growth countries to decline relative to the share of 
low growth countries. 
The trends and patterns reviewed above apply to overall bilateral fiows, and 
some differences do appear for each of the different aid channels which this 
encompasses (see Table 5). Yet these are not the differences which one would 
expect. Contrary to expectations if one perceives government-to-government aid 
as a tool of export policy, one finds this channel even more heavily 
concentrated on low income and low growth countries than the other channels, 
substantially more so even than the NGO channel. As for Petro-Canada 
International, its distinguishing feature is its very high concentration on low 
growth countries, a finding not inconsistent with its mission to assist 
countries severely affected by dependence on imported oil. Its largest 
recipients to date have been the hard-pressed countries of Ghana and Senegal. 
The Industrial Cooperation program is, as one would expect, relatively more 
concentrated on higher income and higher growth countries. So, interestingly, 
is IDRC, but this is not surprising when one considers that IDRC provides funds 
mainly for research by Third World scientists. The absorptive capacity of the 
poorest countries for such research funds is of course relatively limited. 
The tendency for the bulk of Canadian aid to be concentrated on poorer, slower 
growing countries suggests that countries are not selected primarily with 
commercial objectives in mind. Statistical analyses confirm this impression. 
Multivariate econometric studies which have been done on the distribution of 
Canadian aid have found no significant relationship between Canadian aid and 
the extent of commercial transactions between Canada and potential recipients, 
a result which contrasts with that obtained for most other donor countries 
where a positive relationship is observed (Dudley and Monmarquette, pp. 88-91; 
similar results in Bencivenga, annex tables). 
Statistical analysis does suggest that political objectives are important, 
however. Dudley and Monmarquette found that recipient-country membership in 
either the commonwealth or the francophone communities were the two most 
important explanatory factors in their regressions in terms both of eligibility 
for aid and amounts received. An Bencivenga found some correlation between 
Canadian aid fiows and the political legitimacy of the government in the 
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recipient country, as measured by the non-exclusion of opposition parties from 
domestic politics.16 
East-West tensions also corne into play, and It is noteworthy in this regard 
that most countries in the 'non-eligible' category are those aligned with the 
communist bloc. Canada is not rigidly.ideological in its selection of recipient 
countries, however. Left-leaning countries such as Mozambique, Ethiopia and 
Nicaragua are important recipients, as were Michael Manley's Jamaica and Joey 
Bishop's Grenada in earlier years. Cuba was a recipient for a few years in the 
mid-1970s, and bilateral aid to China was a modest but not insignificant $13.5 
million in 1984-85. Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized the relatively non- 
ideological foreign aid stance of the Canadian government at the 1983 
Commonwealth meeting in St. Lucia, declaring that: 
In our view, states have the right to follow whatever ideological path they 
choose ... If they keep their social and humanitarian obligations to their 
people in the forefront of their actions, they will have Canada's help 
(cited In Davies, 1986). 
The distribution of Canadian aid can of course be political without being 
nationally seif-serving, insofar as it is used to encourage not only economic 
but also political development in the Third World. Under this category, one 
finds that Canadian aid has been used to provide a special measure of 
assistance to newly independent countries in the early years of nationhood: 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the early 1950s, Commonwealth Africa and the 
Caribbean in the 1960s, Bangladesh in the 1970s, and the somewhat different 
cases of Zimbabwe and Nicaragua in the 1980s. Bencivenga's finding that Canada 
has tended to support relatively democratic regimes would likewise be 
applauded; and it is now a part of official government policy to consider the 
human rights record of a government in determining the nature of Canadian 
assistance (CIDA, Elements, p. 11). Meanwhile, Canada has also provided 
support for projects facilitating regional integration in the Caribbean and 
Africa (Paragg, McBride), including strong support, in recent years, for SADCC, 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (IDAFSA, May, 1985). 
The distribution of aid is also influenced by various factors such as a common 
historical heritage, cultural values, linguistic factors and institutional 
links which tie nome countries relatively more closely to Canada than others, 
in brief what was referred to in section II as sense of community. The 
concentration of Canadian aid in Commonwealth and francophone countries can no 
doubt be explained largely in these terms. 
One way to test for the importance of such considerations is to use the pattern 
of NGO assistance to different countries as a proxy for community type links 
with Canada and to test the explanatory value of this variable against 
government-to-government flows. Controlling for other possible influences such 
16 Bencivenga's results for this variable are significant at the 95% level In one of ber four 
regressions and significant at the 90% level In another. Bovever, ber results are surely veakened 
sabstantially by the fact that she runs separate regressions on loans and grants, rather than siiply sundng 
the tvo. 
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as a recipient country's national income per capita, its growth rate and its 
absolute population, we found non-governmental flows to be statistically 
significant at the 99% level of confidence and to be by far the best predictor 
of government-to-government flows between 1980 and 1983. The results obtained 
were found to differ substantially for large and for small countries, however. 
For 44 countries with populations of less than five million, the NGO variable 
was the only significant explanatory variable, and its addition to the model 
had the effect of almost tripling the model's explanatory value, raising the R2 
(the share of variance which is explained) from .181 to fully .502.17 For the 
58 langer countries in out sample, the NGO variable had a much smaller effect, 
raising the R2 only from .182 to .266. In this case it was found that the per 
capita income of the recipient country was also statistically significant (t = 
-2.25) and approximately as important in explanatory power as the NGO presence. 
If we are correct in treating NGO aid flows as a proxy mainly for 
Institutional, cultural and linguistic links, then it would seern that such 
links are quite important indeed for small countries. They are evidently less 
important for large countries, displaced from consideration by other variables 
such as the country's level of per capita income or broader political issues. 
Uses of Government-to-Government Aid 
Turning now to the ways that Canadian aid has been used within recipient 
countries, we will restrict our discussion to the government-to-government 
channel. Two general characteristics stand out: the relatively non- 
interventionist approach which CIDA takes with regard to recipient country 
request for aid, and the important effect of aid tying on project selection and 
design. 
CIDA's approach to government-to-government aid involves a variable degree of 
responsiveness to the priorities of the recipient country government. It is at 
its most flexible when contributions take the form of 'program' aid given in 
support of a country's balance of payments. Usually, this involves the 
provision of Canadian products for sale on local markets. Local currency 
income from the sale of these products is then used as a source of revenue for 
development projects. Canadian products are usually delivered to the recipient 
in the form of food aid or commodity aid, but lines of credit for Canadian 
equipment are also used. The amount of program aid being supplied has increased 
substantially in recent years, rising to over 40% of bilateral aid in 1984-85 
from 22 to 24% between 1978 and 1980 (Task Force on Canada's ODA program, 1986, 
p. 53). This increase may be seen as a response to the growing need for this 
type of assistance under the conditions of economic crisis prevailing in the 
1980s; but with program aid being much easier to administer than project aid, 
11 One of the peculiarities of both governsent-to-govera.ent and NGO aid flous in the Canadian case is 
the exceptionally high aiount given per capita to the Couonvealth Caribbean countries. It is to a large 
extent this relationship that the regression results for scall countries reflects. insofar as this is the 
case, ve say conclude that NGO flous are lndeed a fairly good proxy for couunity-type links betveen 
conotries, since Canada does have a tradition of close contact vith the Couonvealth Caribbean. Bxperiments 
vith the use of a duuy for Couonvealth Caribbean countries did yield highly significant results, but the 
NGO variable continued to perfora very strongly. The effect of the NGO proxy on governcent-to-governuent ald 
flous thon does Rot appear to be restricted to the Couonvealth Caribbean countries. 
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it also serves as a partial solution to the difficulties of aid-management 
under conditions of ever-worsening staff shortages brought upon by staff 
cutbacks throughout the federal government. 
The largest recipients of program aid are in South Asia - particularly 
Bangladesh and India, where most Canadian aid takes this form. Funds generated 
from the sale of Canadian products in the recipient country are deposited 
directly into government coffers or into a 'counterpart fund' from which they 
can be withdrawn for use in projects under conditions agreed upon between the 
recipient government and CIDA. Such funds are administered by the recipient 
country, although CIDA in some African cases maintains substantial control over 
the uses made of the funds. Use of the funds in other cases has been left 
essentially to the discretion of the recipient country government (Charlton, 
1986). 
CIDA has become more concerned with the surrounding 'policy environment' in 
countries which receive program aid, and it has become somewhat more active in 
encouraging policy reform. Operating in collaboration with other donors, its 
approach of "positive conditionality" has been to provide extra support for 
countries undertaking reforms, cases in point being Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and 
Zambia (Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 6, 1986, p. 
11:27; and Charlton, 1986). 
Most government-to-government aid is provided for specific projects, however. 
Canada's approach to such project aid is a 'responsive' one in which aid 
projects are selected either at the initiative of, or in close consultation 
with, the government of the recipient country. CIDA will indicate a preference 
for certain sectors of activity, and it may initiate projects, in consultation 
with the recipient or with other donors. In other cases, project ideas may be 
reformulated in directions fairly distinct from the relatively vague proposais 
originally presented by the recipient. CIDA is a more active participant in 
this relationship today than it was, but under normal circumstances the 
emphasis remains on the need for a strongly collaborative relationship. CIDA 
has adopted explicit sectoral priorities in the 1980s (agriculture, energy, and 
human resources), but these are interpreted quite broadly, with agriculture 
including forestry and fisheries, for instance, while participation in other 
sectors is not precluded. 
CIDA's relatively 'responsive' approach to project selection can be understood 
in political terms.18 It reflects a respect for the sovereignty of recipient 
countries upon which Canada prides itself as a non-colonial power. As Nossal 
points out, representatives of the state in a donor country are in any case 
likely to be particularly well-disposed to recognizing the legitimacy of their 
counterparts in other states (Nossal, 1984). A responsive approach also has 
much to commend it on practical grounds, since projects are most likely to 
succeed if they are enthusiastically supported by the recipient government as 
well as by the donor. Finally, there is a foreign policy dimension to the 
18 For a different view, see lyse, vho criticizes the extent to which Canadian ald IL interventionist 
and vho explains this in tees of 'bureaucratic considerations' (1983, pp.67-68). 
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approach, since it is undoubtedly a good way for a middling power like Canada 
to retain in favour of the recipient country's political elite. 
A question that arises is whether Canada's political objectives on this issue 
do not at times conflict with its development objectives. The issue is a 
complex one, but is certainly conceivable that a responsive approach to the 
priorities of a country's political elite might lead to suboptimal projects 
from the point of view of politically weak segments of that saine society, in 
particular the poor and the marginalized. CIDA is not entirely blind to such 
possibilities, of course, and the notion of responsiveness Is a relative on 
which Is selectively applied. How often conflicts of diplomatic and 
developmental priorities actually occur, however, is an empirical question on 
which no systematic study has even been don. One study of Canadian aid to 
Senegal identified some Important cases in which political considerations had 
In fact overridden developmental ones (Lavergne, forth.), but political 
considerations have been more important in Senegal than elsewhere for Canada, 
and It would be dangerous to generalize from the results of this one study. 
The second major determinant of how government-to-government aid is used within 
recipient countries is the tying of such aid to Canadian procurement of goods 
and services. Canadian government-to-government aid continues to be 
approximately 80% tied, a high level of tying by international standards. CIDA 
has tried to reduce the cost tying by focussing systematically on commodities 
or sectors where Canada is relatively competitive. As a major grain exporter, 
Canada is one of the largest suppliers of food aid.19 It also tends to be 
heavily involved in such sectors as railways and electricity (see Table 6), and 
Canadian aid in sectors such as agriculture or education tends, likewise, to 
involve goods and services which can be supplied with the least cost 
disadvantage. Examples would include the supply of phosphate fertilizers to 
Bangladesh, the development of highly mechanized wheat farms in Tanzania, and 
the establishment of an engineering school in Senegal (Ehrhardt; Young; and 
Lavergne, forth.) 
Such choices reduce the immediate cost of aid tying, but they also bias the 
selection and design of aid projects, and the choices which result may or may 
not be optimal from a development perspective. Tying warrants against types of 
involvement which tend to use predominantly domestic resources, and some of the 
best projects unfortunately fall into this category. These are projects based 
on intermediate technology, and they are often projects in such sectors as 
primary health and education whose direct benefits accrue mainly to the poorer 
segments of society In the recipient country. Tying also influences the design 
of projects by favouring Canadian inputs over those which could be obtained 
locally or abroad. Such designs tend to be less than optimal in terms of cost- 
effectiveness and impose high maintenance costs of various kinds on the 
recipient country. The import-bias of project designs further serves to 
reinforce the dependence of recipient countries on imported technology. 
19 Food aid constituted 18.6% of total Canadian ODA between 1975 and 1984. This aid vas provided both 
as goveratent-to-govern.ent aid (22% of all such flows) and as multilateral ald (22% of all such flows as 
well). 
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The secular decline of government-to-government aid as a share of ODA has had 
the effect of reducing the overall level of tying in Canadian aid, since flows 
through other channels are more likely to be united. Our calculations indicate 
that the tfed share of Canadian ODA dropped from 71.5% of the total in 1970 to 
a low of 48.7% in 1978. From there, it rose again to 52.4% In 1984 as a result 
of the decline in multilateral assistance identified earlier.20 OECD data show 
overall Canadian ODA to have been more heavily tied than any other donor 
country except Austria in 1982/1983 (OECD, 1984, Table 1.3). 
The policy of tying so much of Canadian aid responds to Canadian commercial 
interests, and commercial aims have been increasingly catered to in recent 
years by a greater emphasis on parallel financing involving CIDA and Canada's 
Export Development Corporation (EDC). Although much of the mixed credit 
provided by Canada since 1981 has been financed exclusively with EDC funds 
which are not counted as ODA, use has also been made of CIDA funds for this 
purpose. In three years, between 1981 and 1983, about $150 million In 
government-to-government funds were used in parallel financing projects with 
the EDC. This amounted to only about 3% of Canadian ODA but fully 7% of 
government-to-government aid flows. Although the use of such parallel 
financing was foreseen in the 1975 Strateav it does not appear to have been 
initiated until 1978 or to have attained appreciable proportions until 1981.21 
Aid funds used in this way are tied to Canadian procurement in a manner that 
actually involves double or triple tying, in the sense that each aid dollar is 
tied to the procurement of several dollars worth of Canadian goods and 
services, as part of the overall financial package. 
Management Police 
What can one say, finally, about Canada's aid management policy? This is not a 
topic to which one can do justice in the space of two or three pages, but it 
may be useful to at least identify some of the questions and hypotheses which 
should be addressed. Aid management will of course differ for each aid 
channel, and we will restrict the discussion essentially to the government-to- 
government channel. The key question is whether the management of government- 
to-government aid is such as to give primacy to the development objective, or 
whether development finds itself being displaced on a day-to-day basis by 
political and commercial objectives or even by bureaucratic interests and other 
private objectives. 
The answer resides to a large extent in the degree of independence which CIDA 
enjoys. That independence Is quite high but not unlimited. CIDA is a separate 
government department whose president is a civil servant equivalent in status 
20 In these calculations, ve have considered the follovinq proportions of varions ald flous to be tied: 
100% of all food ald, 0% of non-food ultilateral aid, 10% of non-food governaent-to-governient assistance, 
80% of Petro-Canada international (even though these fonds are not forially tied), 0% of International 
E.ergency Relief, 80% of Institutional Cooperation (classified under NGO in the text), 0% of other NGO, 0% of 
IDRC, 100% of Industrial Cooperation and 100% of 'other'. 
21 See data In Dept. of Finance, 'Export Financing', p. 11 and CIDA's Eleaents of Canada's Overseas 
Develop ent Assistance Strategy 1914. p. 44. 
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to a deputy minister, and it is responsible for most aspects of Canadian aid, 
the exceptions being contributions to the World Bank (which devolve to the 
Department of Finance), and flows through independently-managed institutions 
such as IDRC and PCIAC.22 CIDA responsibility for the rest of the aid program 
is as a rule not shared with other departments. 
Political intervention in the implementation of the aid program usually 
involves the minister responsible for the Agency, or, at a step removed, the 
Prime Minister himself. This may Involve specific Instructions to pursue a 
project of interest to the minister, or at least instructions to seriously 
consider it. Reasons for ministerial intervention usually involve foreign 
policy considerations, such as the need to follow up on promises made in high 
level meetings between the Prime Minister and the President of the recipient 
country, or international agreements to collaborate on a particular task, but 
projects may also be encouraged for commercial reasons, a case in point being 
the large PANAFTEL telecommunications project in West Africa.23 The Minister 
also intervenes in the allocation of contracts, and Monique Vezina (Minister 
under the Conservatives until June 1986) was particularly interventionist In 
this regard in an effort to ensure a better regional representation of firms 
doing business with CIDA (Ottawa, Citizen, Feb. 3, 1986). Ministerial approval 
is required for all contracts above $100,000. 
CIDA's independence is limited in other ways simply by virtue of the fact that 
CIDA Is part of the Canadian civil service. It is not CIDA, but Treasury 
Board, which decides on the proportion of the aid budget which is to be 
allocated for administration; and it is Treasury Board which determines 
personnel allocations in the field. Staffing is coordlnated through the Public 
Service commission, and domestic procurement takes place through Supplies and 
Services. Arrangements such as these are adopted in the interests of 
efficiency and control, and need not be discussed here, though it must be said 
that they sometimes created as many problems as they solve for an agency like 
CIDA where flexibility in management is especially desirable. Nor are 
efficiency and control always the only objectives being pursued. Politics and 
bureaucratic interests undoubtedly intrude and help to explain some of the 
management problems which affect the Agency.24 One thinks for example of 
22 IDRC reports directly to Parliaient, vhile governient responsibility for PCIAC devolves to the 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. Mo mention bas been made in this paper of the International Centre 
for Ocean Development (ICOD), vhich vas nevly created In February 1985 and does not therefore show op in the 
aid statistics. Also independently-eanaged, ICOD reports directly to Parliaient. 
23 Exampies of all these forts of intervention may be found in out ovn study of Canadian aid to Senegal 
(Lavergne, forth.) 
24 Ve vill not discuss here the possible role of bureaucratic politics in determining the internai 
management style of the Agency itself, ma(nly because ve consider the topic too complet to be adequately 
treated here, but also becaase it seems ont of place to consider the results of bureaucratic politics as part 
of goverament policy. Bateaucratic politics viii alvays be present, irrespective of government policy, and 
vhile this does not make the phenomenon any less interesting or important, it does suggest that It should be 
treated as a separate research topic. Chose vho are lnterested may refer to Peter Vyse's monogram on the 
topic (1983, especially pp. 58-69(. Ryse's thesis Is that bureaucratic considerations are of primary 
34 
decisions regarding the limited allocation of personnel in the field. 
Virtually ail observera of Canadian aid have criticized the shortage of field 
staff, and the problem is a long-standing one whose non-resolution insiders 
attribute in large part to bureaucratic infighting between External Affairs and 
CIDA concerning the relative presence of the two departments in the recipient 
country. 
Bureaucratic considerations aside, a Gloser look at CIDA's day-to-day 
operations çM help to clarify the 'true' policy objectives being pursued. 
This is mot an area that has been systematically researched In quite those 
terms, but it may be worthwhile to draw on background research done by the 
North-South Institute In Its evaluation project on Canadian aid,25 to offer a 
few tentative generalizations about how Canada's aid objectives are perceived 
within the Agency. The view which I share with my former colleagues from the 
North-South Institute 1s that CIDA staff perceive their own role In terms quite 
consistent with the official terms of reference reviewed in section II of this 
paper, which is to say that the development objective is definitely primary in 
their minds. They recent interference In the program by other departments, and 
they themselves seem as a rule to pay little attention to the long-term 
commercial implications of the aid program. Their response to aid tying is to 
seek out areas of intervention where Canadian goods and services are most 
competitive within the context of the recipient country's development needs, 
and most of them seem to believe that tying does little to impede the 
developmental effectiveness of Canadian aid. 
CIDA documents such as project proposais and country program reviews reflect 
much the saure sort of preoccupation, though it must be noted here that these 
documents do, systematically, address commercial and political dimensions as 
well as development needs. This tells us little or nothing about the priority 
being accorded to each of these dimensions, however, as it reflects a 
bureaucratic requirement for comprehensiveness in the preparation of documents. 
Proposais will indeed often attempt to embellish the commercial gains of a 
project or program in an attempt better to 'sell' the initiative to higher 
authorities! The impression one gains is that someone considers these points 
important, including perhaps those writing the document, but they do not as a 
cule constitute the primary thrust of the proposai. 
25 The lorth-South Institute proiect vas a three year study resultinq in the publication of four case 
studies on Canadian aid tu Bangladesh, 9aiti, Senegal and Tanzania (Ehrhardt, 1983; English, 1984; Lavergne, 
forth.; and Toung, 1983). The issue of role perception vas not addressed systematically in these studies, 
hovever, and the conclusions presented here reflect my general impressions and those of my colleaques as 
based upon our interview vork and document research vithin the Agency. 
35 
IV. DETERMINANTS OF CANADIAN AID POLICY 
What, then, of the 'determinants' of Canadian aid policy? What can we say, in 
particular,- about the true objectives of the aid program as described above? 
Consider first the commercial dimension. 
One may ask what the aid program would resemble if it were, as some have 
suggested, designed primarily to satisfy commercial objectives. This is not a 
difficult question to answer since a Canadian program of that sort does In 
fact exist in the guise of the Export Development Corporation (EDC). An aid 
program which was primarily commercial in focus would behave essentially like 
the EDC, except that it would concentrate its attention on Third World 
countries. It would provide mostly loans; and any grants or soft loans which 
were provided would be 'mixed' with loans at commercial rates in order to 
maximize the sales impact of the aid. That aid would be directed exclusively 
through commercially-oriented channels and It would probably be directed mainly 
to the dynamic markets of higher income and higher growth LDCs. The Agency 
would maintain close links with the export community, and It would be 
responsive mainly to initiatives identified by that community, with special 
attention to possibilities for long-term market penetration. 
It should be more than obvious from the previous section that the Canadian aid 
program is nothing of the sort. Canadian aid is provided on the softest of 
terms, and mixed credits account even in recent years for only 3% of Canadian 
ODA. Less than half of Canadian aid is provided through channels capable of 
generating very much at all in the way of commercial benefits for Canada: 
43.7% through the government-to-government channel, 2.6% through Petro-Canada 
International and 1.9% through the Industrial Cooperation program in 1984. And 
it goes predominantly to the poorest and slowest growing Third World countries. 
The Agency is as a rule responsive not to Canadian business initiatives but to 
requests received from recipient countries and it operates quite independently 
on a day-to-day basis from the Department of International Trade. It should be 
obvious that the primary motivation of Canadian aid policy is not a commercial 
one. 
Commercial interests do intrude upon the aid program, however. The main 
instrument for this is aid tying, and over half of Canadian ODA remains tied 
even today. Support for Canadian commercial interests is also provided through 
the Industrial Cooperation program, through the use of mixed credit 
arrangements and through occasional political intervention in support of 
favoured projects or in contract allocations. CIDA documents make it clear 
that commercial considerations are a criterion In the choice of recipient 
countries, although that influence is not, as we have seen, statistically 
apparent. One can nonetheless identify several recipient countries whose 
choice has probably been influenced to some extent by commercial 
considerations. At the risk of error in the absence of detailed case studies, 
one could probably include here Algeria, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Zaire, 
Cameroon and perhaps a number of others whose needs are for large 
Infrastructure projects of Interest to Canadian business. 
Procurement tying is by far the principal instrument of export promotion 
associated with the aid program, and it is this policy above all which has 
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Influenced academic thinking about the nature of Canadian aid. As the North- 
South Institute points out, 
Critics of aid programmes point to tying probably more than to 
any other factor as an example of the self-interestedness of 
"donors", and for many It has become a cause of deep cynicism 
about aid in general (North-South Institute, 1977, p. 125). 
Tying is indeed difficult to understand In national terms. As many observers 
have pointed out, it provides little real benefit to the Canadian economy, 
while imposing substantial costs on the ability of Canadian aid to deliver 
cost-effective development assistance (Economic Council of Canada, 1978; 
Lavergne, forth.; North-South Institute, 1977, p. 126; Treasury Board, 1976; 
Triantis; and Wyse, p. 1-12). Unable to understand aid tying in terms of the 
stated objectives of the aid program, critics have thus tended to question the 
integrity of those objectives themselves. 
But governments are not necessarily rational, and government do not necessarily 
believe the critics on such matters as aid tylng. Canadian politicians are 
subjected to a barrage of conflicting and biased sources of information on such 
matters, and they are quite capable, like individuals, of believing what they 
want to believe. Canadian politicians are naturally predisposed to believe 
that more than one objective can be satisfied at once - hence the concept of 
'mutual' benefits and never that of 'conflicting' benefits. Such an approach 
is also the easiest one to maintain politically, and there is substantial 
advantage in pretending that everyone's objectives for the aid program can be 
satisfied simultaneously. One of the remarkable facts about tying in Canada is 
that very little effort has been made by the government to assess its costs. 
Those costs are conveniently ignored, and the issue is rarely addressed even in 
project documents within the Agency. 
Tying can also be understood as the aid program's sop to influential business 
interests and to others, in and out of the government, who would otherwise not 
support the aid program. The role of tying in this regard is to achieve a 
greater degree of consensus on the aid program as a whole. Other ways of 
achieving such consensus could no doubt be found, but they would require more 
leadership on the issue than the government has been willing to provide in 
recent years. 
An important question Is whether the Canadian aid program has in fact become 
more commercially oriented over time. There is evidence that it has, but any 
statement in this regard must be a qualified one. Policymakers have become 
more actively conscious of commercial objectives, and they have sought out new 
ways of effectively satisfying these objectives in recent years by the use of 
mixed credits and the Industrial Cooperation program; but the trends in other 
respects are more ambiguous. Aid to multilateral agencies has declined as a 
share of ODA relative to the peak which was reached In 1976, but It remains 
much higher than in the 1960s and early 1970s, and it would be higher yet if 
the IDA replenishment negotiations had been more successful. At the saine time, 
Increasing recourse has also been made to such development Institutions as the 
NGOs and IDRC, and the share of ODA being allocated through more 'commercial' 
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channels such as government-to-government aid, Petro-Canada International and 
industrial Cooperation actually declined slightly from 55.8% to 48.2% between 
1975 and 1984. Turning to the allocation of aid among countries, one does find 
that the share going to higher income LDCs has increased, but this is a long- 
term trend associated with the reduction of aid to India, and the trend does 
not seem to have accelerated in recent years. At the same time, the share of 
aid going to the poorest developing countries has also tended to increase, as 
has the share going to low growth countries other than India. 
The suggestion that Canadian aid has become increasingly commercialized must be 
interpreted in relative terras. It is certainly more commercialized today than 
one would have believed after reading the 1975 Strateav which promised that 
government-to-government aid was to be partially untied and which paid almost 
no attention to Canadian commercial interests. One the other hand, commercial 
objectives do not in practice appear to be all that much more 'primary' than 
before in the making of Canadian aid policy. There appears to be a feeling 
that any new efforts in a commercial direction should not be achieved at the 
expense of what Canada is already doing in the way of development. The 
abandonment of the Trade and Development facility in response to cutbacks in 
the growth targets for aid was a clear manifestation of this policy approach. 
The political dimension of Canadian aid is more difficult to assess than the 
commercial one. Canadian aid is without doubt an arm of Canadian foreign 
policy, and this is hardly surprising in view of the fact that for many 
recipient countries the aid link is by far the most important aspect of their 
relationship with Canada. But aid can be political without being self- 
interested, an even self-interest may be interpreted in terms of fostering 
"harmonious and fruitful relationships between nations" (CIDA, Strategy, p. 
17). In neither case need a political orientation be Inconsistent with a 
generous and humanitarian aid policy. 
Canadian political interests have of course influenced Canadian aid policy in 
some respects. They help to explain In the neat division of ald between 
francophone and anglophone africa and the extraordinary dispersal of Canadian 
aid to 125 different recipient countries between 1980 and 1984. They also help 
to explain the 'responsive' approach to project selection and design. And they 
help to explain the territorial conflicts between CIDA and External Affairs 
with regard to representation in the field. Yet Canada does not use its aid in 
a heavy-handed way as 'leverage' to obtain favours from recipient countries, 
and most observers suggest that there are few political gains to be gotten from 
foreign aid anyway, particularly for small donors (Bird, 1981; Lyon and Tareq, 
p. xxxix; Wyse, pp. 19-22). The limited importance of self-serving foreign 
policy objectives in Canadian aid is suggested also by the decreasing use which 
is being made of government-to-government aid as opposed to other channels and 
by the concentration of aid on low income and low growth recipients who are 
unlikely to have much to offer Canada in terms of any qui pro quo arrangements. 
Such countries may at best be able to offer their votes in the United Nations 
on Issues which are of Importance to Canada, but any donor trading for UN votes 
would do best to concentrate its aid among a large number of small countries. 
Statistical analyses have not been able to uncover any significant Canadian 
blas In favour of small countries. 
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These observations, combined with those made earlier about the limited 
commercial orientation of the aid program, suggest that Canadian aid objectives 
are, as the rhetoric suggests, primarily developmental and humanitarian in 
orientation. 
The willingness of Canadians to contribute as a nation to the alleviation of 
world poverty is not so difficult to understand. In a world where the yole of 
the state in redressing income inequalities has assumed axiomatic legitimacy - 
barely dented even by Thatcherism and Reaganomics - it requires little 
Imagination to extend de same concept beyond the borders of the nation-state. 
Willingness to do so is limited by two factors: the reduced sense of community 
which exists between people of distant places, and the weakness of 
institutional mechanisms for ensuring that all members of the world community 
share equally the burden of redistribution. With modern telecommunication and 
air transport continuing to make the world a smaller place, the sense of 
community which exists between Canadians and the poor of the Third World has no 
doubt increased in recent decades and can be expected to continue increasing in 
the future. 
Too much can be made of the importance of Canadian humanitarian sentiment 
regarding the Third World. The amount contributed by Canadians to the Third 
World on a voluntary basis is niggling when computed on a per capita basis: 
US$5.30 per Canadian in 198326! The amount redistributed through the 
government is more substantial, amounting to US$57.41 per capita, but it is 
little by comparison to the amount redistributed internally to support the poor 
in Canada. The latter was in the order of US$1,622 per capita in 1983.27 Such 
discrepancies can be explained in large part by the public good nature of 
income redistribution,28 and the availability or non-availability of 
appropriate institutions to supply such a good. Income redistribution at the 
national level is a national public good (to some extent even a municipal or 
provincial one)29 for which collective action can be mobilized through existing 
government institutions. The benefits of foreign aid are mostly international 
in scope, however, and at this level there are no institutions comparable in 
power and authority to domestic governments. 
26 This coipares to a veighted average of $3.41 for the DAC group of countries (Sevell et al. p. 206). 
27 This inclodes all transfers tu persons in the consolidated govetaient sector. Canada, Dept. of 
Finance, Bconoiic leviev 1914, Table 6.15 and Reference tables 1 and 74. 
21 loch a statement needs to be qualified. the notion of iacoue redistribution as a public good inplies 
that it is a volontary gestore on the part of the rich, vhich is never quite true. It is aostly true at the 
international level; but at the doiestic level, the poor do bave the vote and it is reasonable to assune that 
the aiount of redistribution vhich taies place donestically extends beyond vhat the redistributors vould 
inpose opon theaselves if the decision vas vholly their ovn. 
29 As Sandler et al. (p. 25) and Pauly (1913) point ont, incone redistribution as a public good is 
characterized by 'spacial non-availability,' in the sense that its benefits to the donor decline as a 
fonction of social and geographic 'distance.' 
39 
The public good dimension of world poverty reduction explain why Canadian 
behaviour in the aid field is not normally determined independently but rather 
through negotiation with other donor countries. Such negotiations and the 
resulting international agreements are, after ail, the only avallable mechanism 
for securing international cooperation in such matters. As a middle power, 
Canada has a particular interest in seeking and supporting international 
solutions to world problems. It is too small to have much impact on such 
problems when acting alone, yet large enough to have an impact when speaking or 
acting in support of international measures. 
Canada has in fact tended to take internationally-set targets seriously, though 
certainly not as seriously as many would like. Although paying lip service to 
UN targets as a long-run objective, the government did not establish a 
timetable for meeting the .7% target until the early 1980s. Since then, the 
timetable has been repeatedly reneged upon, and the ODA/GNP ratio has not risen 
at anything like the promised rate. Some limited progress bue, been made in the 
direction of the UN target, however, and it can be argued that Canada's ODA 
would have grown more slowly if at ail as a function of GNP in the absence of 
this target. By committing itself to meeting the UN target, the Canadian 
government has been better placed to resist pressure to cut back on the growth 
of foreign aid in times of sluggish economic growth and acute budget deficits. 
Canadian ald to multilateral agencies has also been influenced by commitments 
made in collaboration with other donors. The discussion of IDA-6 and IDA-7 in 
Section III showed that Canada, along with other donor countries, has given 
substantial Importance to traditional burden-sharing arrangements in the area 
of multilateral finance, to the point where this was allowed substantially to 
exode Canadian contributions to IDA in the 1980s. 
A third area of international agreement which may be mentioned is that 
concerning aid to the least developed countries (LLDCs). This category was 
established by the United Nations in 1971 in a resolution asking that special 
measures be taken to assist these countries, and the matter was studied by the 
DAC in 1972. The increased attention thus being brought to LLDCs seems to have 
had a strong impact on Canadian aid to this group of countries, which shot up 
dramatically in 1971 and continued to increase through the 1970s. Over 30% of 
Canada's bilateral aid.now goes to this group of countries (see Figure 11). 
One dimension of international negotiations which appears not to have had much 
effect on Canadian practices relates to the tying of bilateral aid. The 
possibility of donors untying aid on a reciprocal multilateral basis was the 
subject of difficult negotiations in the DAC in the early and mid-1970s, but 
Canada was among the most hard-line of countries resisting untying agreements 
(North-South Institute, 1977, p. 126). Canada has not applied a 1974 
Memorandum of Understanding by the majority of DAC members to untie bilateral 
development loans in favour of procurement in developing countries. As noted 
in section III, only Austria performs worse than Canada on the percentage of 
its aid which remains tied. The reasons behind Canada's tylng policy have 
already been discussed. That Canada should be more reluctant to untie than 
other donors is possibly explained by the particular weakness of Canadian 
manufacturing in Third World markets. Canadian officiais are particularly 
touchy on the subject of aid tying. The feeling seems to be that Canada is 
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justified to use aid as a form of subsidy for infant manufactured-export 
industries, and that Canada cannot, as an underdog, afford to let aid contracts 
fall to Its competitors. 
Overall, however, the concept of foreign aid as an international public good 
seems to have substantial explanatory power, both for understanding the limited 
nature of Canada's contribution to reducing world poverty, and for appreciating 
the importance of international efforts to coordinate donor country policies. 
It Is evident that Canadian ald policy has in fact been influenced by these 
efforts. 
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GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT 875.3 43.7 
-Anglophone Africa 195.1 




MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE 690.8 34.5 
-General UN Programs 72.3 
-World Food Program 149.9 
-World Bank 207.7 
-Asia Dev. Bank 92.0 
-African Dev. Bank 46.2 
-Inter-American Dev. Bank 23.5 
-Commonwealth and Francophone 17.4 
-Intern. Humanitarian Ass. 13.6 
-Other 68.2 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 186.6 9.3 
-Canadian NGOs 168.6 
-International NGOs 18.0 
INT. DEV. RESEARCH CENTRE 76.3 3.8 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE* 75.2 3.8 
PETRO-CANADA INTERNATIONAL 51.5 2.6 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 38.5 1.9 
OTHER 7.5 .4 
ADMINISTRATION 99.3 n.a. 
TOTAL 2100.6 100.0 
*Excludes International Humanitarian Assistance which is included 
here under Multilateral Assistance. 
Source: CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, Table B. 
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TABLE 2: TOP 40 RECIPIENTS OF COUNTRY-T0-COUKTRY FL011S 
RÀNKED ACCORDING TO ALLOCABLE COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY FLO1IS, 1980-84. 
(thousands of dollars and percent) 
COUNTRY C-C C-C C-C C-C 1980-84 1980-84 1980-84 AS % 1980-84 1980-84 
OR REGION 1960-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 Y. CUM Y. 6OV-GOV 
ONLY 
OF C-C Z CUM % 
1 8A46LADESH 0 187751 289271 475583 11.0 11.0 460620 96.9 13.4 13.4 
2 PAKISTAN 189953 169658 319699 303889 7.0 18.0 263391 86.7 7.7 21.0 
3 INDIA 466879 451901 322629 280339 6.5 24.5 231268 82.5 6.7 27.8 
4 SRI LANKA 33026 36004 91050 203405 4.7 29.3 195778 96.3 5.7 33.5 
5 TANZANIA 11914 71640 100688 181193 4.2 33.4 156134 86.2 4.5 38.0 
6 KENYA 7851 18825 47318 174589 4.0 37.5 153458 87.9 4.5 42.5 
7 INDONESIA 6996 64391 99785 143477 3.3 40.8 130941 91.3 3.8 46.3 
8 SENE6AL 4847 26475 41082 104264 2.4 43.2 77096 73.9 2.2 48.5 
9 6HANA 22583 49460 81015 101861 2.4 45.6 62165 61.0 1.8 50.3 
10 CAMEROON 6496 22671 63336 101768 2.4 47.9 91315 89.7 2.7 53.0 
Il EGYPT- 0 131 45268 101036 2.3 50.3 92248 91.3 2.7 55.6 
12 ETHIOPIA 142 9239 8449 100560 2.3 52.6 53319 53.0 1.5 57.2 
13 MICA 8917 17891 38497 89497 2.1 54.7 76256 85.2 2.2 59.4 
14 ZAIRE 3482 12812 29323 88503 2.0 56.7 81669 92.3 2.4 61.8 
15 ZAMBIA 2395 11431 60635 77952 1.8 58.5 74594 95.7 2.2 63.9 
16 SAHEL 0 0 44659 75201 1.7 60.3 74326 98.8 2.2 66.1 
17 THAILAND 5516 2867 11483 70572 1.6 61.9 36115 51.2 1.0 67.2 
18 SUOAN 27 568 5895 70314 1.6 63.5 50288 71.5 1.5 68.6 
19 MALI 464 11364 38577 61417 1.4 65.0 54620 88.9 1.6 70.2 
20 ZIMBABWE 682 444 360 54801 1.3 66.2 40159 73.3 1.2 71.4 
21 (iNA4DA 4432 9931 32679 54703 1.3 67.5 52484 95.9 1.5 72.9 
22 NAITI 164 3007 37258 54508 1.3 68.8 34258 62.8 1.0 73.9 
23 PERU 484 3935 25611 51614 1.2 70.0 32985 63.9 1.0 74.9 
24 BURKINA FASO 87 8318 29813 50086 1.2 71.1 42182 84.2 1.2 76.1 
25 CARIBBEAN RE6 - 15501 2615 10026 48160 1.1 72.2 14517 30.1 .4 76.5 
26 TUNISIA 14051 49787 72058 47836 1.1 73.3 43623 91.2 1.3 77.8 
27 NIGER 2897 43661 39710 47011 1.1 74.4 44440 94.5 1.3 79.1 
28 HONDURAS 64 3926 20851 42622 1.0 75.4 31830 74.7 .9 80.0 
29 NEPAI. 59 3342 15849 42190 1.0 76.4 35638 84.5 1.0 81.0 
30 MALAWI 1305 11314 69534 41648 1.0 77.4 38976 93.6 1.1 82.2 
31 IVORY COAST 2613 19660 50821 39122 .9 78.3 32875 84.0 1.0 83.1 
32 AL6ERIA 8665 27511 22354 37696 .9 79.1 36817 97.7 1.1 84.2 
33 COLOMBIA 564 19501 29424 36105 .8 80.0 19513 54.0 .6 84.7 
34 MOZAMBIQUE 0 25 8661 34707 .8 80.8 29627 85.4 .9 85.6 
35 NICARAGUA 0 2734 3495 33619 .8 81.6 19199 57.1 .6 86.2 
36 TURKEY 1582 19398 223 31929 .7 82.3 30921 96.8 .9 87.1 
37 BOLIVIA 135 2211 6070 31162 .7 83.0 19914 63.9 .6 87.6 
38 MOROCCO 2688 24019 19124 30220 .7 83.7 26470 87.6 .8 88.4 
39 CHINA 0 6 0 28352 .7 84.4 12488 44.0 .4 88.8 
40 ASIA RE6104 L 3146 6058 16143 28293 .7 85.0 9988 35.3 .3 89.1 
OTHER 124121 338309 530998 646695 15.0 100.0 376237 58.2 10.9 100.0 
TOTAL 954728 1764811 2770921 4316699 100 0 3440646 81.8 100 0 
Source: CIDA, 'ODA Systen', conputerized data base, and Annual Report, 1984. 
Excludes country-to-country aid not allocable by country. 
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TABLE 3: AID PER CAPITA FOR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES BY INCOME 
(dollars) 
INCOME GROUP 1960 1970 1980 1983 
BANGLADESH 0.000 0.000 .861 1.202 
OTHER $50-100 .007 .061 .426 .505 
INDIA .051 .188 .048 .070 
OTHER $100-200 .013 .104 .402 .443 
PAKISTAN .306 .778 .500 .818 
OTHER $200-300 .001 .169 .500 .635 
$300-600 .003 .130 .211 .391 
$600+ .000 .068 .072 .247 
Source: Calculated using data from CIDA, "ODA System", 
computerized data base, and sources identified in notes to 
Figures 7-10. 
TABLE 4: AID PER CAPITA FOR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES BY GROWTH RATE 
(dollars) 
GROWTH 1960 1970 1980 1981 1983 
GROUP 
GR.<0 .001 .209 .649 .866 1.167 
INDIA .051 .188 .048 .061 .070 
GR.0-2% .054 .197 .249 .316 .374 
GR.0-2% LESS INDIA .058 .212 .582 .736 .874 
GR.2-4% .011 .115 .270 .262 .308 
GR.4-6t .007 .082 .321 .336 .256 
GR.6-10% .000 .032 .062 .082 .101 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE .031 .152 .275 .326 .378 
Source: Calculated from CIDA, "ODA System", computerized data 
base, and sources indicated in notes to Figures 16 and 17. 
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TABLE 5: COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY DISBURSEMENTS BY CHANNEL AND BY 
COUNTRY GROUP CLASSIFIED BY PER CAPITA INCOME IN 1970 
AND GROWTH RATE, 1970-81. 




ALL IND. EMERG. CANADA 
C-C NGO IDRC COOP. RELIEF INT. GOV-GOV 
50-100 .348 .243 .145 .077 .181 .133 .404 
INDIA (100) .059 .076 .048 .039 .000 .000 .063 
100-200 .246 .255 .250 .269 .531 .128 .241 
200-300 .163 .215 .148 .301 .137 .573 .126 
300-600 .132 .168 .229 .177 .073 .000 .130 
600+ .052 .044 .179 .137 .077 .166 .035 
GROWTH RATE 
<0 .216 .216 .123 .125 .151 .622 .199 
0-2 .458 .469 .361 .205 .726 .134 .480 
INDIA(2%) .059 .076 .048 .-30 .000 .000 .063 
2-4 .162 .117 .239 .300 .041 .238 .161 
4-6 .087 .095 .160 .297 .048 .006 .083 
6-10 .018 .028 .069 .035 .034 .000 .014 
Source: Calculated from sources indicated in notes to Figures 7-10 and 12. 
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TABLE 6: SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT FLOUS 







Planning & public admin. 3.1 1.5 
Public utilities 48.6* 18.0 
Agriculture & rural dev. 14.0** 22.5** 
Industry, mining, const. 4.1 11.3 
Commercial services 1.2 .5 
Education 10.5 12.8 
Health 2.2 2.5 
Social infras. & welfare 2.5 3.7 
Multisectoral 2.3 7.0 
Unspecified 11.5 Z0.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
(t) Distributed as follows between 1973 and 1977: power 
production and distribution (20.6%), water supply (19.9%), 
communications (12.5%) and transport (45.5%). Such data were not 
available for other years in the sources consulted. 
(**) Includes lines of credit for fertilizer. 
Sources: North-South Institute, "Background Report", p. 37; and 
OECD, Development Cooperation, 1980, Table B.5, and 1984, Table 
II.E.3. Data reporting by CIDA to the OECD has not been 
consistent over the years, and It Is thus not possible to 
establish trends over time. One notes in particular that the 
share of bilateral ODA defined as "allocable" varies from 49.8% 
in 1975 (Develogment Cooperation, 1976, Table 22) to 83.0% in 
1983 (Development Cooperation, 1984, Table II.E.3). CIDA informs 
us that data for the 1970s represent strictly government-to- 
government flows while data for the 1980s include commitments for 
other bilateral aid channels (or disbursements when commitments 
data were unavailable). 
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FIGURE 1 
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NOTES TO FIGURES 1-17 
Unless otherwise indicated, data in figures 1-17 has been calculated from data 
in CIDA's computerized data base "ODA System", otherwise referred to as 
"Historical ODA Disbursement Data". Data for 1984 were drawn directly from 
Canada, CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85. Ail data are by fiscal year (e.g. data 
indicated as 1983 is really for April 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984), but are 
otherwise the saure as data published by the OECD. 
Figures 1 and 2: Data on ald allocations were drawn from several sources. 
Canada, External Aid office, Annual Review, 1966-67 (data for 1951-66); North- 
South Institute, 1977, p. 115 (crude figures for 1967-69); Canada, CIDA, Canada 
and Development Cooperation. 1975-76, p. 121 and 1977-789, p. 31 (data for 
1970-77); CIDA, "ODA System" (ODA disbursement data for 1978-83, since 
allocations and disbursements are identical after 1978). GNP data are from 
Canada, Dept. of Finance, Economic Review, April 1984, p. 134. ODA/GNP ratios 
were obtained for 1984 and 1985 respectively in Canada, CIDA, Annual Report, 
1984-85, and Canada, 1986-87 Estimates (Part I). 
Figure 2: Data are for net flows of ODA and derive from CIDA "ODA System" for 
1950-1983. Data sources for GNP and for ODA/GNP ratios in 1984 and 1985 are 
indicated above in the note for Figure 1. 
Figure 3: Includes capital subscriptions as grants on the grounds that these 
yield no financial returns and are unlikely ever to be recalled. 
Figure 4: Data are for net flows of ODA. Points shown for 1984-85 and 1985-86 
are projections and estimates drawn from Canada, 1985-86 Estimates, Part I, p. 
23, and are best viewed as declarations of Intent than as firm predictions. 
Figure 5: Ail ratios indicated in Figures 5 and 6 exclude administration costs 
from bilatéral assistance after 1979. Prior to 1979, administration costs were 
included in each category. 
Figure 6: This figure shows non-governmental organizations and institutions 
(added together here for simplification under the title "NGO.ICDS"), the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Industrial Cooperation 
program (IND. COOP) and Petro-Canada International. Two other categories of 
bilateral aid were omitted from Figure 6 in order to simplify the presentation. 
The first of these is an 'other' category which amounts to only 5% once 
administration costs are removed (see note for Figure 5). The second Is 
International Emergency Relief, shown as "Humanitarian Assistance" in Table 1. 
This type of aid has shown no pronounced trend to increase or decrease over 
time. Amounts provided in this category have fluctuated substantially from 
year to year but have rarely exceeded 5% of bilateral aid. The weighted 
average between 1949 and 1983 was 1.75%. This rose to 3.8% in1984. Note that 
the decline in the NGO share shown for 1984 is more apparent than real, since 
it reflects a redirection of NGO funds to relief efforts in Africa. These 
funds thus reappear under International Emergency Relief. 
Figures 7 to 10: These figures provide data on bilateral flows (C to C) to 
recipient countries grouped Into categories according to their per capita GDP 
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in U.S. dollar in 1970 as per the UN Statistical Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1980 edition, Vol. II, "International Tables," Table 1A. Neither 
high income Arab oil producers nor South Africa were considered par of the 
Third World tn these groupings. Per capita income data for 1970 were used 
because they were more complete than data for other years. The weighted 
average Income of the Third World being $223 U.S. In 1970, we have defined as 
low income all countries with a per capita income of less than $200. This 
includes all countries shown in Figures 7-9. India's per capita income in 1970 
was exactly $100, while the per capita income of Bangladesh was $81, and that 
of Pakistan $175 (in terms of today's borders). Bangladesh and Pakistan must 
be considered together in Figure 9 in order to obtain a consistent time trend 
because separate aid data are not available prior to 1972 for Bangladesh, which 
was then East Pakistan. Several countries are excluded from consideration in 
these figures. The most important of these is China, excluded on the grounds 
that aid to China was very low on a per capita basis for reasons mainly 
unrelated to that country's per capita income. Aid to China was $7.3 million 
in 1983, or $.007 per capita, as shown in Table 1. The data also exclude 
countries for which data on per capita incomes were unavailable, as well as aid 
given to regional groups of countries. Also excluded here are bilateral flows 
for which disbursements by country were not available. Unallocable bilateral 
flows accounted for 20.0% of the total between 1980 and 1983. The remaining 
sample accounted for 93.0% of 'allocable' bilateral flows and 74.4% of total 
bilateral flows between 1980 and 1983. 
Figure 11: The definition of Least Developed Countries (LDC) has changed over 
the years to include different countries. For the list used in the present 
work, see CIDA, Annual Report, 1983-84, pp. 76 and 88. However it is necessary 
to omit Bangladesh from this list in order to obtain a consistent time series 
further back than 1973 (see previous note). Figure 11 provides two series, one 
including Bangladesh (labelled "LLDC"), and one excluding Bangladesh ("LLDC NO 
BANG"). 
Figure 12: This figure gives the average per capita income of countries 
receiving Canadian aid (weighted by Canadian bilateral aid disbursements) as a 
proportion of the average income of all Third World countries in each year. 
Annual estimates of per capita incomes by countries were obtained by using data 
for 1970 (see note for Figures 7-10), GNP growth rates for 1960-70 and 1970-81 
and population growth rates for the same years (obtained from the World Bank's 
World Development Report. 1983 Annex Tables 2 and 19. Missing data for some 
countries were filled in ad hoc fashion of the basis of data for other years. 
Growth data being too often unavailable for 1950-60 and for 1981-83, we simply 
used 1960 data for years prior to 1960, and 1981 data for 1982 and 1983. This 
imprecision is of little consequence since it is the relative income of 
countries which is important. The data exclude the saine countries as in 
Figures 7-10. 
Figures 13-15: These figures provide data for six regions, grouped together 
with due regard for visual presentation. Aid to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
having been presented already in Figures 7 and 8, Figure 13 provides data on 
other Asian countries. Figure 14 presents data on the Caribbean region 
(including Belize and Guyana) and on Anglophone africa (defined to include 
former British colonies, former Portuguese colonies, and Ethiopia). Figure 15 
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provides data on Francophone Africa, on Latin America (Mexico, Central America 
plus South America, except Belize and Guyana), and Europe (where Turkey has 
been the most important recipient country, but also, at one time or another, 
Greece, Malta and Cyprus). 
Figures 16 and 17: These figures are based on growth rates of GDP per capita 
for 1970-81 as described in the note for Figure 12. The following groups of 
countries are charted: those with negative growth rates, India (with a growth 
rate of 1.5%), and those with growth rates of 0-2% (excluding India), 2-4%, 4- 
6%, and 6-10%. 
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